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MERE COMMON OWNERSHIP
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
*

THOMAS A. LAMBERT

Abstract: "Common ownership," also called "horizontal shareholding," refers to a
stock investor's ownership of minority stakes in multiple competing firms. Recent
empirical studies have purported to show that institutional investors' common
ownership reduces competition among commonly owned competitors. "Mere
common ownership" is horizontal shareholding that is not accompanied by any sort
of illicit agreement, such as a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, or the holding of a control-conferring stake. This Article considers the legality of mere common ownership under the U.S. antitrust laws. Prominent antitrust scholars and the leading treatise have concluded that mere common ownership that has the incidental effect of
lessening market competition may violate both Section 7 of the Clayton Act and
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. This Article, however, demonstrates otherwise.
Competition-lessening instances of mere common ownership do not violate Section
7 of the Clayton Act because they fall within its "solely-for-investment" provision,
which the scholars calling for condemnation have misinterpreted. Mere common
ownership does not run afoul of Section 1 of the Sherman Act because it lacks the
sort of agreement (contract, combination, or conspiracy) required for liability under
that provision. From a social welfare standpoint, these legal outcomes are desirable.
Condemning mere common ownership under the antitrust laws would likely entail
significant costs, and the benefits such condemnation would secure are speculative.
Accordingly, this Article argues courts and enforcers should not stretch the antitrust
laws to condemn mere common ownership.
INTRODUCTION

In contemporary antitrust parlance, "common ownership" (also called "horizontal shareholding") refers to a stock investor's ownership of minority stakes
in competing firms. Common ownership is similar to, but distinct from, "cross
ownership," which occurs when one firm owns stock of its competitor or when
an investor holding a majority interest in one firm also owns stock of a competing firm.' Any mutual fund or exchange-traded fund that holds minority shares

© 2020, Thomas A. Lambert. All rights reserved.
* Wall Family Chair in Corporate Law and Governance, University of Missouri Law School.
1See Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, AntitrustforInstitutionalInvestors,82 ANTITRUST
L.J. 221, 232 (2018) (distinguishing "cross ownership" and "common ownership").
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of competing companies is engaged in common ownership. 2 As investment in
such funds has proliferated, particularly with the soaring popularity of low-cost
index funds, common ownership has become quite significant. 3 Today, the largest providers of mutual and index funds may each own sizable percentages of
every major competitor in a market.4
A number of antitrust scholars have expressed concerns about this development. Harvard Law School Professor Einer Elhauge, for example, wrote in the
HarvardLaw Review that "[a]n economic blockbuster has recently been exposed"-namely, "[a] small group of institutions has acquired large shareholdings in horizontal competitors throughout our economy, causing them to compete less vigorously with each other." 5 Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton,
and E. Glen Weyl (Posner et al.) echoed Professor Elhauge's worries that common ownership has anticompetitive effects, writing in the AntitrustLaw Journal
that "the concentration of markets through large institutional investors is the ma-

2 A mutual fund is an entity that aggregates money from many individuals and invests it in a
professionally managed portfolio of assets, typically stocks of other companies. See U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Mutual Funds, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/
investment-products/mutual-funds-and-exchange-traded-funds-etfs [https://perma.cc/KXX9-9RVP].
Mutual funds provide investors with instant diversification, which reduces their investment risk. Id
Like a mutual fund, an exchange-traded fund (ETF) is a diversified investment pool wherein retail
investors may purchase shares. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Exchange-TradedFunds (ETFs),
INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/investment-products/exchangetraded-funds-etfs [https://perma.cc/PGW6-82U8]. But whereas shares in mutual funds are priced once
a day based on the net asset value of the fund (i.e., assets minus liabilities, divided by the number of
shares outstanding), shares in ETFs are traded on an exchange at market prices that may differ from
the net asset value. Id
s An index fund is a mutual fund or ETF that is invested in the companies included in a stock
index, which is a pre-determined list of companies designed to represent some sector of the stock
market orperhaps the economy as a whole (e.g., the S&P 500 Index). See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Index Funds, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/investmentproducts/index-funds [https://perma.cc/ET7C-YRNF]. The managers of an index fund, unlike those of
an actively managed mutual fund or ETF, do not exercise discretion in choosing the companies to
invest in. Id. Accordingly, index funds generally charge lower management fees than do actively
managed funds. Id. The combination of instant diversification with very low management fees has
drastically boosted the popularity of index funds. See Dawn Lim, Index FundsAre the New Kings of
Wall Street, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the-newkings-of-wall-street-11568799004 [https://perma.cc/7JMN-D372] (observing that funds tracking
broad U.S. stock indexes held $4.27 trillion in assets as of August 31, 2019, for the first time surpassing actively managed funds, which then held assets of $4.25 trillion).
4 The largest asset managers include Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street Global Advisers, and
Fidelity Investments which, for example, may ownbetween 2% and 10% of all competitors in a market. Mutual Fund Directory |2020: Top 100 Mutual Fund Companies Ranked by AUM, MUTUALFUNDDIRECTORY.ORG, https://mutualfunddirectory.org [https://perma.cc/A3D4-PQ87] (ranking
mutual funds by their assets under management) (last updated Aug. 11, 2020).
s Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2016) [hereinafter
Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding] (expressing concern about the anticompetitive effects of horizontal
shareholding).
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jor new antitrust challenge of our time." 6 Other leading antitrust commentators
have concurred that institutional investors' common ownership poses a competitive threat and may violate the antitrust laws.7
Antitrust enforcement agencies have responded to these scholars' concerns.
At a March 2016 hearing before a Senate subcommittee, William J. Baer, thenAssistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division ofthe U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ), announced that enforcers were investigating potential antitrust
issues stemming from investors' common ownership of the stock of multiple
firms competing in concentrated industries." In March 2018, Margrethe Vestager,
European Commissioner of Competition, announced that a similar investigation
was under way in the European Union. 9 And in December 2018, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) devoted four panels to common ownership as part
of its Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the twenty-first century. 0
These actions raise questions about when exactly common ownership violates the antitrust laws. To be sure, common ownership can be a component of a
scheme that injures competition and runs afoul of antitrust prohibitions. Examples of common ownership that violate the antitrust laws include: (1) when an

6Eric A. Posner et al., A Proposalto Limit the Anticompetitive Power ofInstitutionalInvestors,
81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 669-70 (2017) [hereinafter Posner et al., Proposal];see also Eric Posner et
al.,A MonopolyDonaldTrump Can Pop, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
12/07/opinion/a-monopoly-donald-trump-can-pop.html [https://penna.cc/YEB6-C2QL] ("The great,
but mostly unknown, antitrust story of our time is the astonishing rise of the institutional investor . .
and the challenge that it poses to market competition.").
See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, OverlappingFinancialInvestor Ownership, Market Power, and
Antitrust Enforcement: My QualifiedAgreement with ProfessorElhauge, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 212,
213 (2016), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/vo129_Baker-2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/27N3-S3CU]; Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, HorizontalShareholding and
Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026, 2027 (2018).
'Barry A. Nigro, Jr., Cross-Ownershipby InstitutionalInvestors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Mar. 31, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/31/cross-ownership-byinstitutional-investors/#1 [https://perma.cc/P8P5-87XB]. Major institutional investors appear to be
concerned about regulatory interventions to police common ownership. The world's largest asset
manager BlackRock, Inc. recently disclosed in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
filing that its "business operations, reputation orfinancial condition" could be "adversely affected" by
proposed policies to address competition concerns arising from common ownership. BlackRock, Inc.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 26 (Feb. 28, 2018).
9 See Margrethe Vestager, Comm'r for Competition, European Comm'n, Speech at Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht International EU Competition Law Forum: A Market That Works for Consumers (Mar. 12, 2018), https://wayback.archive-it.org/12090/20191129214816/https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/market-works-consumers_en
[https://perma.cc/92Q9-QLFH].
' See FTCHearing#8: Common Ownership, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Dec. 6,2018), https://www.
ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/ftc-hearing-8-competition-consumer-protection-21 st-century
[https://penna.cc/JCM3-3XKQ].
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"

investor facilitates a hub-and-spoke conspiracy " by helping multiple competing
firms to collude; (2) when a group of investors that all own stakes in multiple
competitors agree to pressure those firms to limit competition among themselves; and (3) when a single investor with sufficient managerial control in all
the firms in a market causes each firm to limit competition with its rivals.' 2 In all
of these situations, common ownership plus something else that would reduce
competition, such as an illicit trade-restraining agreement or ownership stakes
sufficient to confer control, would cause antitrust liability to attach.
But what about common ownership simpliciter-that is, horizontal shareholding without an agreement among investors or portfolio firms and lacking an
ownership stake sufficient to confer managerial control on a shareholder owning
stakes in multiple firms within the market? A number of prominent scholars have
asserted that the federal antitrust laws condemn "mere" common ownership that
has the incidental effect of reducing competition.' 4 They say the practice may
violate both the prohibition in Section 7 of the Clayton Act on stock acquisitions
that substantially lessen competition in a market " and the ban in Section 1 ofthe

" A hub-and-spoke conspiracy, also known as a wheel conspiracy, occurs when "a single member or group . .. separately agrees with two or more other members or groups" to engage in unlawful
activity. Wheel Conspiracy, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
" Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 222 (observing that a per se illegal "'hub and spoke' conspiracy" would result from portfolio managers "acting as a 'cartel ringmaster,' who organized a cartel
among the competing [portfolio companies] in orderto restrict output and increase prices"); see Douglas H. Ginsburg & Keith Klovers, Common Sense About Common Ownership, 2 CONCURRENCES
REV. 1, 3 (2018), https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-2-2018/articles/common-senseabout-common-ownership-86847-en [https://penna.cc/C9PM-Z6V5] (describing the modem conception of hub-and-spoke conspiracies). See generallyUnited States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3 d 290, 314 (2d
Cir. 2015) (describing modem hub-and-spoke conspiracies).
" The first and second scenarios -a hub-and-spoke conspiracy and an agreement among common owners to pursue a lessening of competition among their portfolio firms would violate Section
1 of the Sherman Act's prohibition of contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unreasonably
restrain trade. See 15 U. S.C. § 1(2018). The third scenario, the ownership of control-conferring interests in competing firms, would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act if such ownership threatened a
"substantial lessening of competition." See id. § 18.
14
See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUSTPRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

¶ 1204b

(4th ed. Cum. Supp. 2020); Elhauge, Horizontal

&

Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1302-04; Einer Elhauge, How HorizontalShareholdingHarms Our
Economy-And WhyAntitrustLaw CanFix It, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 207,255-56,269 (2020) [hereinafter Elhauge, Horizontal ShareholdingHarm];Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 677-78;
Scott Morton & Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 2033.
15
See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1203c ("[S]o-called horizontal shareholding is reachable under [Section] 7 where the threat to competition is present. This phenomenon occurs
when a relatively small number of investors, typically institutional, acquire large overlapping interests
in two or more firms." (footnote omitted)); Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supranote 5, at 130204 (contending that mere common ownership may violate 15 U.S.C. § 18); Scott Morton
Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 2033-35 (same).
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Sherman Act on contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unreasonably
restrain trade.16
This Article demonstrates that mere common ownership by institutional investors, even if it incidentally contributes to a softening of competition, does not
violate the U.S. antitrust laws. Mere common ownership does not give rise to
liability under Section 7 of the Clayton Act because it falls within the provision's
"solely-for-investment" exemption, which both Professor Elhauge's scholarship
and the leading antitrusttreatise have misinterpreted. 7 Mere common ownership
is not illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act because it entails no traderestraining contract, combination, or conspiracy.'s As a policy matter, antitrust
law's failure to condemn mere common ownership is a good thing, as the marginal cost of such condemnation would likely exceed the marginal benefit produced.' 9
In developing these points, the Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets the
stage by describing the theory as to how mere common ownership may soften
competition and briefly summarizes the key empirical studies purportingto support that theory.20 Part II addresses Section 7 of the Clayton Act and shows that
mere common ownership is exempt from that provision's ban on stock acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition. 2' Part III considers Section 1 of
the Sherman Act and explains why mere common ownership does not run afoul
of that provision's prohibition of trade-restraining contracts, combinations, or
conspiracies.22 Shifting from law to policy, Part IV concludes by explaining why
social welfare would likely be reduced if antitrustlaw did condemn mere common ownership. 23
I. THE PURPORTED ANTICOMPETITIVE HARMS
OF COMMON OWNERSHIP

The scholars sounding alarm bells over common ownership have theorized
that it softens competition by altering the incentives of corporate managers.24
16 See, e.g., Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 269-70
(contending that
mere common ownership may violate 15 U.S.C. § 1); Scott Morton & Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at
2035-36 (same).
17 See discussion infra Part II.
1 See discussion infra Part
III.
19 See discussion infra Part IV.
20 See discussion infra Part I.
21
See discussion infra Part II.
22
See discussion infra Part III.
2
See discussion infra Part IV.
24 See generally Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1268-70 (arguing
that the
incentive to reduce prices as a means of increasing profits is diminished by common ownership);
Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 685-86.

2020]

Common Ownership andAntitrust

2919

Most of the time, those managers, responding to their shareholders' desires, seek
to maximize the profits of their individual firms-i.e., "own-firm" profits. That
typically involves growing market share, which entails price and quality competition from which consumers benefit. Even though a firm's profits would normally be greater with collusion than with vigorous competition, the desire to
maximize own-firm profits usually generates aggressive price and quality competition. When collusion or tacit coordination emerges and drives up prices, firm
managers know that they could earn even greater profits by slightly underpricing
their rivals so as to win business, and when one firm cheats in this fashion, others tend to follow suit, causing price coordination to unravel and competition to
reemerge. 2 5 The desire to maximize own-firm profits, then, fosters the sort of
competition that maximizes consumer surplus.
Unlike most shareholders, investors holding stock in all the firms in a market-i.e., "intra-industry diversified" investors-prefer that each firm's managers maximize industry profits, rather than own-firm profits. This influences these
shareholders' preferences with regard to how vigorously the firms they are invested in compete. When one firm gains market share, it usurps the sales from
another firm in which the intra-industry diversified investor also holds a stake.
And it typically does so by reducing price or spending more to enhance quality,
so its profit margin on the usurped sale is lower. Intra-industry diversified investors would thus prefer that firms limit their price and quality competition to generate the highest industry, rather than own-firm, profits. 26
But why would firm managers defer to intra-industry diversified investors
over the shareholders who own the bulk of the stock and who would prefer ownfirm profit maximization? The theory is that the largest intra-industry diversified
investors-the major institutional investors-are better positioned to influence
management. Relative to individual shareholders, these investors possess more
extensive monitoring resources and greater expertise on matters of business
strategy and firm policy. Additionally, they have greater incentive to monitor the
degree that managers are promoting their interests because they hold larger
25

As Professor Einer Elhauge explains:
In competitive markets where ownership is separate, economic models prove that firms
have incentives to undercut each others' prices because the profits they gain from the
additional sales exceed the price reduction caused by their own conduct. Because each
firm sets prices based on the same calculus, they keep undercutting each other until they
drive down prices toward marginal cost, which is the most efficient level.

Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supra note 5, at 1269.
26 See id. at 1279 ("For such [intra-industry diversified] institutional investors,
managers who
increase individual corporate performance by competing with rivals and taking away market share
decrease institutional investor profits across the industry by decreasing industry profits. Institutional
investors are more likely to prefer managers who maximize industry profits by avoiding competition.").
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stakes. 27 Their votes are also more likely to attractmedia attention, which gives
managers an even greater incentive to secure their favor. Accordingly, corporate
managers often honor the preferences of institutional investors over those of individual, uncoordinated stockholders, even when the latter group collectively
owns a greater proportion of company stock.28 Managers may therefore seek to
maximize industry profits, which leads them to pull their firms' competitive
punches.
There are strong reasons to question whether intra-industry diversified institutional investors will systematically prefer maximization of industry rather
than own-firm profits. 29 Similarly, the assertion that corporate managers will
defer to institutional investors over the shareholders holding the bulk of their
companies' stock is open to doubt. 30 The primary driver of concerns about common ownership, however, has not been theory. Instead, it has been empirical
studies purporting to demonstrate that common ownership reduces competition.
In the most prominent of those studies, co-authors Jose Azar, Martin C.
Schmalz, and Isabel Tecu (Azar et al.) attempted to test whether institutional
investors' common ownership of the stock of competing domestic airlines increased airfares .31 To measure common ownership incentives and assess the degree that they changed over time, Azar et al. utilized a metric known as "MHHI
27 Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton, and E. Glen Weyl (Posner et al.) emphasize these differences between individual and institutional investors:

The separation of ownership and control that makes possible very large companies
leads to managers who are not supervised by a knowledgeable monitor, but only by
very small individual shareholders who do not have the time, information, or power to
oversee management. Institutional investors by contrast, could potentially improve on
this Berle-Means model of the corporation featuring widely dispersed ownership by
shareholders with tiny stakes by supplying informed and incentivized oversight.
Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 674.
28 According to Posner et al., this conclusion: "[F]ollows from avery simple logic: someone must
determine the firm's goals. That controller is likely to be one of the largest shareholders. If there are
no large concentrated shareholders, then the firm will likely be run in the interests of its institutional
investors even if these do not individually own very large stakes." Id at 684-85.
29 This premise disregards the fact that intra-industry diversified institutional investors are also
inter-industry diversified. Their investments in related industries (either vertically related or complementary) will be adversely affected by supracompetitive pricing in the industry that they are intraindustry diversified in, so it is not clear that they would prefer industry profit maximization. See
Thomas A. Lambert & Michael E. Sykuta, The Casefor Doing NothingA boutInstitutionalInvestors'
Common Ownership ofSmall Stakes in Competing Firms, 13 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 213,233-35 (2019).
3 This premise ignores the fact that firm managers' personal incentives tend to align with those
of the bulk of their shareholders in favor of own-firm profit maximization. This is so because (1) most
corporate managers' company's stock compensates them in part, and (2) most desire to usurp business
from their rivals to burnish their personal reputations for business success. See id. at 235-37.
31 Josd Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513, 1522 (2018)
[hereinafter Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects]; see also Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 223
(reviewing empirical evidence that common ownership causes anticompetitive effects).
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delta" (MHHIA). 32 MHHIA is a component of the "modified HerfindahlHirschman Index" (MHHI), which is an adjusted version of the well-known Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HI") that the antitrust enforcement agencies use in
evaluating prospective mergers. 33 The MHHI seeks to account for both the concentration of the relevant market (HHI) and the degree to which common ownership reduces market participants' incentives to compete. MHHIA is the component of MHHI that accounts for reduced competition incentives occasioned by
common ownership. 34 Thus, MHHI is equal to the sum of HHI and MHHIA.
The objective of MHHIA, which is calculated using a complicated formu35
la, is to assess the likelihood that managers of firms within an industry, assuming that they seek to maximize their shareholders' portfolio returns (weighted by
those shareholders' control), would cause their firms to cut back on price competition in an effort to maximize industry rather than own-firm profits. 36 The prmary factors determining the magnitude of MHHIA are:
" the amount of voting control intra-industry diversified investors have over
the managers of their portfolio firms (MHHIA grows as intra-industry diversified investors have greater voting control);
" the magnitude of the stakes intra-industry diversified investors hold in the
firms within the industry, and the degree that each investor's holdings
across competing firms are ofequal size (the larger the financial stakes held
by intra-industry diversified shareholders and the more equal those stakes
across the competing firms, the higher the MHHIA);
" the degree that the stock (and thus voting control) of firms within the industry is held by non-intra-industry diversified shareholders (when there is

32 Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 31, at 1522.
* See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1,

18-19 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L2ZJ-HQLT] (describing how the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated). HHI
ranges from near zero to 10,000 and is calculated by adding the squares of the market shares of the
firms competing in a market. Id. It assesses the degree to which a market is concentrated, and thus
susceptible to collusion or oligopolistic coordination. Id.
3 Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 31, at 1519, 1522.
5 The precise formula for "MHHI delta" (MHHIA) is:
MHHIA

=

10,000

- X

Zk4

j

S s(X

2.Ik

where Yid is the fraction of shares in firmj controlled by investor i; the shares are both cash flow and
control shares (so control rights are assumed to be proportionate to the investor's share offirmprofits); and s is the market share of firmj. Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 31, at 1522;
Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 271-78 (providing a non-technical explanation of the formula
and detailed instructions for calculating the metric for a particular market).
36 See Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 683-84 (explaining the logic of MHHIA). See
generally Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 224-25 (describing how MHHIA is calculated, its
variables, and its significance in antitrust).
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greater control by investors who are not intra-industry diversified and who
thus prefer own-firm profit maximization, MHHIA is reduced); and
- the market shares of the firms that share common ownership (when their
market shares are larger, the market effect of firm managers' decisions to
pull their competitive punches will be more significant, so MHHIA will be
higher).37
In their airline study, Azar et al. first figured the MHII-IA for each domestic
airline route-each assumed to be a separate market-from 2001 to 2014. They
then examined each route and market to determine how changes in the MHHIA
over time correlated with changes in airfares on that route. 38 After running a
number of regressions to control for route-specific factors that might influence
both fares and the MHHIA, 39 they concluded that common ownership of air carriers increased airfares from 3% to 7%.40
A second widely cited common ownership study attempted to assess how
common ownership has affected service fees and interest rates in local markets
for bank deposits. 41 In that study, co-authors Jose Azar, Sahil Raina, and Martin
C. Schmalz considered how the account fees charged by commercial banks, the
minimum account sizes required to avoid such fees ("fee thresholds"), and the
interest rates the banks paid on deposits correlated with "generalized HHI"
(GHHI), a measure that resembles MHHI. 42 The authors found that for interestbearing checking accounts, a one standard deviation increase in GHHI correlated
with an increase in fees of about 11% and an increase in fee thresholds of around
17%.43 For money market accounts, a similar increase in GHHI correlated with a
" See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 224-25; Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 683-

84.
38 Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 31, at 1526-28.
39 Id. at 1528-29.
40

Id at 1559. See generally Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 224-25 (summarizing the Josd
Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, and Isabel Tecu (Azar et al.) study's empirical approach towards anticompetitive effects in the airline industry). An instrumental variable analysis by the authors found even
greater adverse effects. It suggested that common ownership increased airfares between 10% and
12%. Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 31, at 1559.
41 Josd Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition 1 (May 4, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710252 [https://perma.cc/MBG4M5RC] [hereinafter Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership];see also Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at
226-27 (summarizing the empirical model used in Azar et al.'s study on common ownership inbanking).
42 Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership, supra note 41, at 22-24. The formula for the MHHI, which
works when there is either common ownership of competing firms by third-partiesor cross-ownership
of some firms by others, must be refined if either (1) there is a mixture of common- and crossownership, or (2) the cross-ownership involves both cross-owned firms holding stakes in each other
(e.g., firm A owns a stake in firm B, and firm B owns a stake in A). See Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1277 n.48. The GHHI incorporates this necessary refinement.
43 Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership, supra note 41, at 26-27.
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3% increase in fees and a nearly 17% increase in fee thresholds. 44 The authors
also found that increases in GHHI correlated with a reduction in the interest rates
paid to depositors. 45
Scholars have criticized the airline and banking studies for endogeneity,
given that MHHIA and GHHI turn in part on firms' market shares and on the
number of firms participating in a market, both of which are affected by demand
forces that independently influence market price. 46 Replications designed to
avoid such endogeneity and to correct other asserted methodological errors have
not found anticompetitive effects from common ownership. 47 Professor Elhauge
counters that these methodological criticisms are unfounded, 4 8 and that the studies finding no anticompetitive effect are flawed.49 He also points to other, more
recent studies that purportedly demonstrate anticompetitive effects from common ownership in the pharmaceutical and seed industries.50
4 Id.

45 Id at 23; see also Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 226-27 (summarizing the results of
Azar et al.'s banking study).
46 See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 243-44; Daniel P. O'Brien & Keith Waehrer, The
Competitive Effects ofCommon Ownership: We Know Less Than We Think, 81 ANTITRUSTL.J. 729,
732 (2017) ("[T]he key explanatory variable in this research the modified HHI (MHHI)-depends

on market shares, which depend on the same underlying factors that drive prices. In econometric
terms, market shares and the MHHI are endogenous."). In addition to these endogeneity criticisms, the
studies are deficient because they purport to correlate market outcomes with institutional investors'
incentives, but they never accurately assess what those incentives are. Lambert & Sykuta, supra note
29, at 238-42. The studies assume that an intra-industry diversified institutional investor must prefer
maximization of industry rather than own-firm profits, but that is not at all clear. Institutional investors earn different fees on different funds, and the funds that generate the highest fees tend not to be
fully intra-industry diversified. Id. at 239-42. If institutional investors prefer to maximize the performance of their highest-margin funds, they may well prefer some market outcome other than industry
profit maximization. Because the common ownership studies have not drilled down to the fund level
to determine what market outcomes provide the greatest profits to institutional investors, they have
not properly assessed institutional investors' preferences, and thus cannot have correlated those preferences with market outcomes, as they claim to have done.
'? See Patrick Dennis et al., Common OwnershipDoes Not Have Anticompetitive Effects in the
Airline Industry 33 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working PaperNo. 15, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3063465 [https://perma.cc/XR78-48F3]; Pauline Kennedy et al.,
The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: Economic Foundations and Empirical Evidence 2223 (July 26, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3008331 [https://perma.cc/WVV9-TH8E].
4s Elhauge, Horizontal ShareholdingHarm, supra note 14, at 223-25.
49
Id. at 225-35.
5 Id. at 23 9-44 (first citing Joseph Gerakos & Jin Xie, InstitutionalHorizontalShareholdingsand
Generic Entry in the PharmaceuticalIndustry (Mar. 18, 2019) (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No.
3285161,2019), https://ssm.com/abstract-3285161 [https://perma.cc/LY98-2RN4]; thencitingMelissa
Newham et al., Common OwnershipandMarketEntry: Evidencefrom PharmaceuticalIndustry (DIW
Berlin, Discussion Paper No. 1738, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract-3194394 [https://perma.cc/9CC9DQHF]; and then citing Mohammad Torshizi & Jennifer Clapp, Price Effects of Common Ownership in
the Seed Sector 33-35 (Apr. 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssm.com/abstract=3338485
[https://perma.cc/ND6B-NLGQ]). Professor Elhauge also cites a cross-market study thatfound "that
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I will not attempt to resolve this debate because the central matter this Article addresses is not the empirical question of whether mere common ownership
in fact reduces competition. Instead, the relevant question here is a legal one:
whether mere common ownership passes muster under the antitrust laws, even if
it incidentally lessens competition. Based on the theory and evidence described
above, scholars have argued that mere common ownership may violate both Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act and Section 1 ofthe Sherman Act. Parts II and III consider those two provisions in turn, concluding that mere common ownership offends neither.5
II. SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT

Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which primarily addresses anticompetitive
business mergers, may also restrict partial stock acquisitions.52 The provision
states that "[n]o person engaged in commerce . . shall acquire . . the whole or
anypart ofthe stock . . of another person engaged also in commerce . . where
in any line of commerce . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition." 53 Although this text expressly addresses only anticompetitive acquisitions of stock, an investor could not avoid liability by showing that
none of its discrete purchases of a company's stock would, standing alone, lessen competition.54 Allowing acquirers to avoid Section 7's prohibition by buying
up stock in a series of transactions, none of which would independently lessen
competition, would create an obvious loophole that could render the provision
ineffective. The U.S. Supreme Court has thus concluded that Section 7 forbids
not merely acquiring, but also holding stock when doing so threatens a "substantial lessening of competition" in a market.5 5 In light of that understanding, Professors Elhauge, 56 Scott Morton and Hovenkamp, 57 Posner et al., 58 as well as the
higher levels of horizontal shareholding in consumer goods markets resulted in a statistically significant increase in prices." Elhauge, HorizontalShareholdingHarm, supra note 14, at 241 (citing Hadiye Aslan, Common Ownership, Creative Destruction, and Inequality: Evidence fromU.S. Consumers
8-10 (Sept. 12, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)).
5 See discussion infra Part II (arguing that Section 7 of the Clayton Act does not reach common
ownership); discussion infra Part III (concluding that common ownership does not violate Section 1
of the Sherman Act).
52 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018) (prohibiting stock acquisition when the effect is "substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly").
5 Id. (emphasis added).
5 See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 18; United States v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 241 (1975) (observing that "'acquisition' can mean, and in the context of [Section] 7 of the Clayton Act does mean, both
the purchase of rights in another company and the retention of those rights").
56 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1302-04.
5 Scott Morton & Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 2035 ("The practices involved in horizontal
shareholding generally concern partial stock acquisitions. The same kind of economic theory and
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Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise have all concluded that Section 7 forbids mere
common ownership that has the likely effect of reducing competition in a market. 59
A potential difficulty for this view is the first sentence of Section 7's third
paragraph, which states that "[t]his section shall not apply to persons purchasing
stock solely for investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to
bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition." 60 By its terms, this solely-for-investment provision would seem to exempt
investors engaged in mere common ownership-including institutional investors-from Section 7's prohibitions. The scholars contending that Section 7
reaches mere common ownership, however, have advanced two interpretations
that would prevent the solely-for-investment provision from insulating institutional investors whose horizontal shareholding threatens a "substantial lessening
of competition."
For reasons set forth below, each of those interpretations is flawed. 6 1 Correctly interpreted, the first sentence of Section 7's third paragraph exempts mere
common ownership from Section 7 liability.
A. The Areeda-Hovenkamp View
The influential Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise 62 takes the position that Section
7's solely-for-investment language is not atrue exemption from potential liability. 63 To be a true exemption, there would have to be some stock acquisition or
continued stock holding that would violate Section 7 exceptfor the fact that the
investor acquired the stock or held it "solely for investment." According to the
treatise, such an acquisition or continued holding is an impossibility.

evidence (conventionally used in merger analysis) justifies using Section 7 against horizontal shareholding.").
58 Posner et al., Proposal,supra note 6, at 691 (observing that "[t]he most natural solution"
to the
competitive problems posed by common ownership "is to simply enforce Section 7 of the Clayton
Act").
59 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1203c ("[H]orizontal shareholding is reachable
under [Section] 7 where the threat to competition is present. This phenomenon occurs when a relatively small number of investors, typically institutional, acquire large overlapping share interests in two or
more firms." (footnote omitted)).
60 15 U.S.C. §
18.
61 See discussion infra Part II.A.
62 Antitrust lawyers and judges so extensively rely on the Areeda-Hovenkamp
treatise that Justice
StephenBreyer once wrote that "most practitioners would prefer to have two paragraphs of Areeda's
treatise on their side than three Courts of Appeals or four Supreme Court Justices." Stephen Breyer, In
Memoriam: PhillipE Areeda, 109 HARV. L. REV. 889, 890 (1996).
63 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1204a ("[I]s [the solely-for-investment provision]
truly an 'exception' that immunizes an acquisition that the courts would otherwise deem to violate
[Section] 7? We reach a negative answer .... ").
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Key to the treatise's position is its view that an investor should be presumed to intend the likely consequences of its actions. Under this view, no stock
acquisition that would be likely at the time of purchase to lessen competition
could be solely for investment, as the investor would be purchasing with an "intent" to secure an anticompetitive outcome. 64 Moreover, the continued holding
of legally purchased shares would cease to be "solely for investment" at the very
moment such continued holding became likely to lessen competition (so that the
stockholder was "intending" something beyond investment). The upshot ofthis
reasoning is that there can be no stock acquisition or continued stock holding
that would (1) otherwise violate Section 7's substantive prohibitions, but (2) be
insulated from liability because it was solely for investment. As such, the treatise
concludes, Section 7's solely-for-investment language creates no actual exemption or defense.
The treatise offers three reasons for taking this view. 65 First, it says, "permitting anticompetitive investment is directly contrary to the central purpose of
the Clayton Act. "66 Second, there are a few brief remarks in the legislative history suggesting Congress included the solely-for-investment provision to ease
concerns that the Clayton Act would condemn the ordinary investment practices
of colleges and banks, and the committee reports in both the House and Senate
stated that "the exceptions [made in Section 7] are those which are not deemed
monopolistic and do not tend to restraintrade." 67 Third, as a policy matter, preserving market competition is more important than "protecting particular portfolio diversification," because "[r]arely is a given investment opportunity uniquely
advantageous." 68 The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise's argument is flawed for a
few reasons.

64

The treatise states:
The "true exception" issue would squarely arise only in an acquisition that is deemed
both (a) to be solely for investment and (b) to have a probable anticompetitive effect.
But there could be no such case if the acquirer were presumed to intend the probable
consequences of its act. In that event, a court's finding that the acquisition would probably tend substantially to lessen competition would necessarily mean that the acquirer
so intended, objectively speaking. Consequently, its acquisition could not be solely for
investment.

Id.

¶ 1204b
65

66
67

(footnote omitted).
See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1204b.

Id.¶ 1204b n.8 (first quotingH.R. REP. No. 63-627, at 17 (1914); then quoting S. REP. No. 63-

698, at 13 (1913)).
68 Id. ¶ 1204b.
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The obvious problem with the treatise's interpretation is that it renders the
solely-for-investment provision a nullity. 69 Section 7's substantive prohibitions,
set forth in the provision's first two paragraphs, regulate three things: (1) asset
acquisitions, (2) full mergers where one entity acquires all the stock of a corporation, and (3) partial stock acquisitions.70 The solely-for-investment language in
Section 7's third paragraph clearly could not apply to asset acquisitions (as it
refers to "persons purchasing such stock solely for investment") or to full mergers (because taking all stock entails a transfer of managerial control, so the acquired stock would not be held "solely for investment"). To have any effect
whatsoever, the provision would have to influence the legality of partial stock
acquisitions. But under the Areeda-Hovenkamp interpretation, it would not do so
because any stock acquisition or holding that is illegal under Section 7's substantive prohibitions (i.e., it is likely to reduce competition substantially) could not
be "solely for investment" and thus would remain illegal. The legal outcome
would be exactly the same if the first sentence of Section 7's third paragraph
were excised from the statute.
The treatise maintains that despite the solely-for-investment provision's legal insignificance, it would still "serv[e] the much more limited function ofreassuring investors that the Clayton Act was not designed to interfere with general
investment." 7 ' But it would do no such thing. The substantive prohibitions of
Section 7 forbid stock acquisitions only when their effect "may be substantially

69 The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise concedes this point. See id. (acknowledging that its interpretation conflicts with "the general canon of statutory construction that seeks to give significance to each
statutory provision rather than to make any provision superfluous").
70 The first two paragraphs of Section 7 of the Clayton Act state:

No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons engaged in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in
any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of
proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18.
71 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14,

¶
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to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 7 2 Absent such likely effect, general investment is not forbidden.73 Investors receive no comfort from an
additional provision stating that their investment activities will not be illegal unless their effect "may be substantially to lessen competition," for that is implied
in the substantive liability provisions themselves. Under the Areeda-Hovenkamp
reading, then, the solely-for-investment provision does nothing; it is pure surplusage.
The three reasons the treatise asserts for reading the solely-for-investment
provision out of the statute are unconvincing. First, the fact that anticompetitive
investment is contrary to the Clayton Act's central purpose cannot justify simply
ignoring a statutory exemption. Most of what antitrust regulates is "mixed bag"
conduct-i. e., business activities that may create both harms and benefits such
that some instances of the behavior will impose net harms and others net benefits. 74 For that reason, antitrust law deliberately tolerates some anticompetitive
instances of behavior to avoid deterring efficient ones.75 Antitrust doctrine is also
sensitive to administrative costs and thus sometimes restricts liability for anticompetitive conduct to keep those costs in check. 76 Indeed, much of contemporary antitrust doctrine represents a calculated effort to minimize the sum of social welfare losses from permitting anticompetitive instances of behavior, deterring procompetitive instances, and administering the rules. 77 The AreedaHovenkamp treatise's willingness to render the solely-for-investment provision
15 U.S.C. § 18.
Id.
74 See Thomas A. Lambert, The Limits ofAntitrust in the 21st Century, 68 U. KAN. L. REV. 1097,
1100-02 (2020) (offering examples of antitrust-regulated behaviors that are sometimes outputreducing and sometimes output-enhancing).
75 For example, although it is well-understood that competition may be harmed by so-called "limit" pricing, which occurs when a firm with market power sets its prices above its costs but below the
profit-maximizing level, so as to deter entry, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 161-62 (2005), simple discounts are not condemned unless they
result inbelow-cost pricing. The law tolerates some potential anticompetitive harm to avoid deterring
procompetitive pricing. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
223, 229 (1993) (holding that below-cost pricing is required for predatory pricing liability because
"the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical
ability of a judicial tribunalto control without courtingintolerable risks of chilling legitimateprice
cutting" (emphasis added)).
76 See, e.g., Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 452 (2009) ("Institutional concerns also counsel against recognition of such claims. We have repeatedly emphasized the
importance of clear rules in antitrust law."); Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25
(1st Cir. 1990) ("[A]ntitrust courts normally avoid direct price administration, relying on rules and
remedies . . . that are easier to administer.").
72

73

?? See generally Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court andthe Limits ofAntitrust, 52 B.C. L.

REV. 871 (2011) (discussing the Roberts Court's decision-theoretic approachto antitrust and its implications).
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surplusage because anticompetitive investment is inconsistent with the central
purpose that the Clayton Act implicitly embraces the view that any activity that
threatens competition must be condemned. Such an absolutist position is inappropriate in the antitrust arena, especially when (1) the behavior at issue offers
obvious benefits, and (2) attempts to restrict it would entail large administrative
costs. For reasons set forth in Part IV, intra-industry diversification by institutional investors is exactly that sort of behavior.'g
Second, the legislative history of the solely-for-investment provision does
not justify reading it out of the statute, as the Areeda-Hovenkamp interpretation
would do. As an initial matter, a statute's enacted text, which here speaks of an
actual exemption ("[t]his section shall not apply to"), must trump unenacted legislative history. 79 Beyond that, it is not at all clear that the legislative history of
Section 7 supports the view the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise espouses. For example, in the debates on the Clayton Act, U.S. Senator George W. Norris remarked that "[n]obody wants to prohibit a savings bank or individual or an institution investing their funds in the stock of corporations, whether they are competing or not, if they do not use that method for controlling the corporations." 8 0
Those remarks suggest that Congress intended the solely-for-investment provision to provide a genuine exemption that would turn not on the incidental competitive effect of acquiring or continuing to hold stock, but on whether the stock
was being used to control the company at issue. As explained in Section C of
this Part, a proper interpretation of the solely-for-investment provision is much
closer to that understanding than to the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise's view that
the language has no legal significance."
The treatise's third argument for reading the provision as surplusage is that
"the public interest in competitive markets far outweighs the private interest in
protecting particular portfolio diversification" because "[r]arely is a given investment opportunity uniquely advantageous." 8 2 But the relative social value of
78 See infra notes 242-249 and accompanying text (discussing the high administrative
costs of
MHHI-based lawsuits); infra notes 252-260 and accompanying text (discussing investorbenefits from
low-cost index funds and other intra-industry diversified mutual funds).
79 See 15 U.S.C. § 18; e.g., Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel.
Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 302 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Constitution gives legal effect to the
'Laws' Congress enacts . . not the objectives its Members aimed to achieve in voting for them."
(citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2)); Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 303 (3d
Cir. 2011) (explaining that legislative history cannot trump the plain terms of a statute, absent rare
circumstances); MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating
that policy "considerations cannot trump the statute's plain text and structure" in construing Section
1201(a) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act); Knurr v. Orbital ATK Inc., 276 F. Supp. 3 d 527,
540 (E.D. Va. 2017) ("Legislative history, however, cannot trump plain text.").
80 51 CONG. REC. 14,466 (1914) (statement of Sen. Norris).
81 See discussion infra Part II.C.
82

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14,

¶
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competitive markets versus diversification opportunities for investors is ultimately a legislative judgment. Congress could well have determined that the
benefits of affording non-controlling shareholders diversification freedom likely
outweigh any incremental competitive gains from limiting that freedom. Had
Congress reached that conclusion, it would have included exemption language
resembling the first sentence of Section 7's third paragraph. What is more, the
sort of investment conduct exempted by this Article's interpretation ofthe solely-for-investment provision (set forth in Section C of Part II) is "uniquely advantageous." 8 3 Part IV explains why that is so.84
Ultimately, the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise's interpretation of Section 7's
solely-for-investment provision fails because the treatise wrongly equates a likely adverse effect on competition with non-investment intent (i.e., it assumes that
if a stock purchase would likely impair competition, it could not have been
"solely for investment"). 85 That interpretation is inconsistent with a natural read-

83 See discussion infra Part

II.C.

See discussion infra Part IV.
85 See 15 U.S.C. § 18. The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise cites two cases in support of its view that
a purchase or holding of stock cannot be "solely for investment" if it is likely to cause anticompetitive
effect. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1204b n.7 (first citing In re Golden Grain Macaroni Co., 78 F.T.C. 63, 72 (1971), modified, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972); then citing Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 693 (2d Cir. 1973)). Professors Fiona Scott
Morton and Herbert Hovenkamp cite the same two cases in support of their claim that "[t]wo courts of
appeal agree that the [solely-for-investment] section was meant as little more than an assurance to
purely passive investors rather than as a limitation on the Clayton Act's coverage." Scott Morton
Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 2042. The two cited cases, however, hardly justify reading the solelyfor-investment language out of the statute, as the treatise interpretation, endorsed by Professors Scott
Morton and Hovenkamp, would do. The relevant discussion in In re Golden Grain MacaroniCo. in
1971, which appeared in the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) administrative decision and was
never addressed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's opinion, concerned an acquisition
&

84

that would "necessarily" reduce competition. 78 F.T.C. at 73 ("[W]hen an acquisition will necessarily
affect the competitive behavior of the two involved firms, it cannot be said that the sole purpose of the
acquisition was for investment."). To say that one must intend a necessary effect of their actions is not
to imply that they intend the effects that are only likely, particularly if they have no reason to know
that they are likely. See infra notes 180-185 and accompanying text (observing that the common
ownership studies find a softening of competition resulting from the industry's overall pattern of stock
ownership, which individual investors are typically unaware). In 1973, in Gulf & Western Industries,
Inc. v. GreatAtlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit construed a precedent on the solely-for-investment provision as "say[ing] no more than that the court's
attention should be focused less onwhetherthe purchase constitutes an 'investment' than on whether
the effect (indeed at this juncture the reasonablylikely effect) is substantially to lessen competition."
476 F.2d at 693 (citing Pa. R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 66 F.2d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1933)
(per curiam), aff'd by an equally divided court, 291 U.S. 651 (1934)). But that statement was obiter
dictum, given the court's conclusion that the record did not reflect investment-only intent. See id. at
694 (observing that "the record demonstrates . . that G&W [the investor] will seek to obtain control
of A&P [the portfolio company] and that it has the potential to attain that goal"). Moreover, the Gulf
& Western court engaged in no analysis of the statutory text and blatantly misconstruedPennsylvania
RailroadCo. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
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ing of the text, which speaks ofthe purchaser's purpose in buying the stock, not
its intent about the stock purchase's incidental effect on competition. More importantly, the treatise's interpretation would, for no compelling reason, render
the solely-for-investment provision superfluous.
B. ProfessorElhauge's View
Professor Elhauge has offered an interpretation ofthe solely-for-investment
provision that avoids nullifying the provision but would still exclude intraindustry diversified institutional investors from its protection. 86 That interpretation, however, reads the exemption too narrowly. It is inconsistent with (1) the
case law construing the solely-for-investment provision,8 7 (2) agency regulations
defining "solely for the purpose of investment," 88 (3) the meaning of investment
under the federal securities laws, 89 and (4) Section 7's plain text. 90
As Professor Elhauge correctly observes, Section 7's investment exemption
includes two elements. First, the stock must have been purchased "solely for
investment." 9 1 Second, the stock must not be "us[ed] . . by voting or otherwise
to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition." 92 The first element is met, Professor Elhauge says, only if the investor
refrains from voting its shares (or engages in only "mirror voting" 93), and otherwise exercises no influence over corporate managers. 94 The second element reCircuit interpreted the solely-for-investment provision as creating a genuine exemption, the first element turns on the stock investor's intent in purchasing the stock. See Gulf& W Indus., Inc., 476 F.2d
at 693-94 (citing Pa. R.R. Co., 66 F.2d at 39-40)).
86 As explained below, Professor Elhauge has proposed two interpretations of the solely-forinvestment provision. Bothwould exclude intra-industry diversified institutional investors from liability protection, but only one would avoid rendering the provision superfluous. See infra note 99 and
accompanying text. This Section discusses only the interpretation that would not nullify the solelyfor-investment provision. The alternative interpretation should be rejected forthe same reasons as the
Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise's interpretation.
87 See infra notes 102-121 and accompanying text.
88 See 15 U.S.C. § 18; infra notes 122-132 and accompanying text.
89 See infra notes 133-141 and accompanying text.
90 See infra notes 142-153 and accompanying text.
91
15 U.S.C. § 18.
92

Id

Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1306. "Mirror voting" is voting one's
shares in the proportions wherein all other shares are voted. Doing so ensures that one's shares are
counted to establish a quorum, but do not influence the outcome of the vote. Thomas A. DeCapo
Kenneth E. Burdon, ProposedAmendments to the FederalProxy Rules: Considerationsfor ClosedEndFunds, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.skadden.
com/insights/publications/2019/11/proposed-amendments-to-the-federal-proxy-rules [https://perma.
cc/GL58-PUFX] (defining "mirrorvot[ing]" in the context of the SEC's changes to the federal proxy
rules in November 2019).
94 Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding,supra note 5, at 1306 ("The solely-for-investment element
has been found to be met only when the investor committed either to not vote its stock or (in what
&

93
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quires that the investor's stock ownership not contribute to an actual "lessen[ing]
of competition" or an attempt to do so. 95 The upshot of this interpretation is that,
if an investor satisfies the first element by committing to pure passivity (no voting or engagement with management), that commitment changes the showing
required to establish liability from likely anticompetitive effect to actual or intended anticompetitive harm. 96
Unlike the Areeda-Hovenkamp interpretation, this construal would not render the solely-for-investment provision superfluous, for it would be possible for
a stock acquisition to violate the substantive prohibition of Section 7, and yet be
immunized by the provision. Suppose an investor buying stock in multiple competitors committed not to vote its shares or to attempt to influence the management of any of the rival firms. After its purchase, other investors also bought
shares in multiple firms within the industry, so that the overall pattern of comamounts to the same thing) to vote the shares in the same proportion as other shareholders vote, often
with the additional requirements that the investor not nominate directors, have any representative on
the board, or exert any other form of influence over management."); Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 256 (asserting that "a stock acquisition can be solely for investment only
if the investor does not vote or otherwise influence corporate behavior at all").
95 Elhauge,HorizontalShareholding,supra note 5, at 1308 (observing that even if investors purchased stock solely for investment, "proof that their horizontal shareholdings actually lessened competition . . would negate the passive investor exception and leave the horizontal shareholders subject
to challenge under [Section] 7 of the Clayton Act" (footnote omitted)).
96 Id. at 1308 ("Whereas an active investment can be condemned if it may substantially lessen
competition, a passive investment canbe condemned only if it actually does so orwas intended to do
so."). Specifically, this interpretation shifts the standard of liability from "may be substantially to
lessen competition" (i.e., likely anticompetitive effects) to "bring[ing] about, or attempt[ing] to bring
about, the substantial lessening of competition" (i.e., actual or intended harm). Id at 1302, 1309
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18). Professor Elhauge has more recently written that:
[E]ven if a stock acquisition were solely for investment, that does not really create an
exception, but rather merely changes the standard of proof from "may" substantially
lessen competition to instead require evidence that the stock acquisition was intended to
have anticompetitive effects or actually has or likely would have anticompetitive effects.
Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 256. That latter statement requires
amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that the language "may . . substantially . . lessen
competition" in Section 7's substantive prohibition means that the acquisition is reasonably likely to
lessen competition. See 15 U.S.C. § 18; United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 171
(1964) (observing that requirements for liability under Section 7 "are satisfied when . . the 'reasonable likelihood' of a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market is shown"); United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957) ("We repeat, that the test of a
violation of [Section] 7 is whether, at the time of suit, there is a reasonable probability that the acquisition is likely to result in the condemned restraints."); see also United States v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc.,
172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 180 (D.D.C. 2001) ("To establish a [s]ection 7 violation, plaintiff must show that
a pending acquisition is reasonably likely to cause anticompetitive effects."). Accordingly, if purchasing stock solely for investment "changes the standard of proof," it must alter the standard to require
"actual[]" or "intended . . anticompetitive effects," not merely a likelihood of "anticompetitive effects." Elhauge, HorizontalShareholdingHarm, supra note 14, at 256.
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mon ownership became likely to soften competition. At that point, the substance
of Section 7 would be violated by the first investor's continued common ownership within the industry (as such holding would contribute to a likely "lessening
of competition"), but the investor's common ownership would be exempt from
liability until an anticompetitive effect actually materialized or the investor intended such a reduction in competition. Professor Elhauge's proffered interpretation would thus give the solely-for-investment provision a legal effect so that it
would not be mere surplusage.
At the same time, the interpretationwould not insulate intra-industrydiversified institutional investors from damages liability under Section 7. The exemption's first element would rarely be satisfied by institutional investors, Professor
Elhauge explains, because they almost always vote their shares and often engage
with the management of their portfolio firms. 97 Even if an institutional investor
committed to pure passivity at the time of its purchase, as soon as the pattern of
common ownership actually resulted in higher prices or reduced quality-the
moment a plaintiff could claim damages-the investor would lose the exemption's protection. 98 Professor Elhauge has therefore provided an interpretation of
the solely-for-investment provision that would afford it legal effect, avoiding
surplusage, while preventing it from immunizing institutional investors against
damages liability under Section 7.99

97

Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding,supra note 5, at 1306 (observing that "institutional investors
with a passive investment strategy usually do actively seek to influence corporate management, including by direct communication, having investor executives serve on corporate boards, and voting
their shares to favor positions and management that best advance their investor interests"); Elhauge,
Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 256 ("[A] stock acquisition can be solely for investment only if the investor does not vote or otherwise influence corporate behavior at all, which is
rarely the case for leading horizontal shareholders.").
98 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding,supra note 5, at 1308 ("[E]ven if investors who held horizontal stock were purely passive, proof that their horizontal shareholdings actually lessened competition, such as the Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu study showing that horizontal shareholdings actually raised
airline prices, would negate the passive investor exception and leave the horizontal shareholders subject to challenge under [Section] 7 of the Clayton Act." (citing Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects,
supra note 31, at 1558-59)).
99 Professor Elhauge has actually proposed two interpretations of the solely-for-investment provision. The other interpretation, however, would render the provision a nullity. He writes:
[F]or investors who are completely passive, proving the substantive standard [of liability under Section 7] requires showing that the investors are "using the [purchase of
stock] by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition." I think the better reading of this language is thatthis
standard can be met prophylactically if, at the time of the stock acquisitions, it can be
shown that the purchases of stock were intended to substantially lessen competition or
foreseeably would have that effect because they lessen competitive incentives. In those
cases, the investors are using the purchase of stock to bring about, or attempt to bring
about, a substantial lessening of competition. But one can imagine a narrow reading of
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There are, however, problems with Professor Elhauge's interpretation. Although he correctly reads Section 7's "solely for investment" language as providing an actual exemption if two elements are satisfied, he has misread each of
those two elements.
1. Purchasing the Stock Solely for Investment
First, Professor Elhauge has construed the first element ofthe exemptionthat the investor "purchas[ed] such stock solely for investment"-too narrowly.
He contends that "a stock acquisition can be solely for investment only if the
investor does not vote or otherwise influence corporate behavior at all." 0 0 He
further maintains that:

'

The solely-for-investment element has been found to be met only
when the investor committed either to not vote its stock or (in what
amounts to the same thing) to vote the shares in the same proportion
as other shareholders vote, often with the additional requirements that
the investor not nominate directors, have any representative on the
board, or exert any other form of influence over management.' 0
In actuality, neither the cases applying the solely-for-investment provision nor
agency regulations defining the phrase "solely for the purpose of investment"
support Professor Elhauge's strict interpretation of the exemption's first element.
No case holds that merely voting one's shares or making any effort, however slight, to influence management is inconsistent with purchasing or holding
stock solely for investment. For example, in United States v TracindaInvestment Corp., 02 which Professor Elhauge cites as support for his narrow construal
of the solely-for-investment element,1 03 the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California explained that an investor's purchase of nineteen percent of
the statute that, for completely passive investors, requires waiting until their stock acquisitions actually have those anticompetitive effects before a challenge canbe brought.
Id at 1309 (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18). Under the interpretation that Professor Elhauge refers to as "the better reading," the likelihood that a stock purchase would lessen competition
substantially the trigger for liability under Section 7's substantive prohibition would preclude the
investment exemptionfrom applying. See id Thus, the solely-for-investment provisionwould have no
legal effect because the legal outcome would be the same if the language were excised from the statute (i.e., with or without the language, stock purchases or holdings that made it likely that competition
would be lessened would be forbidden, while those that did not do so, would not be). The discussion
in the text has therefore focused on Professor Elhauge's "narrow reading," which would create an
actual exemption and thus would not render the solely-for-investment language superfluous. See id.
0o Elhauge, HorizontalShareholdingHarm, supra note 14, at 256.
01 Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supra note 5, at 1306.
02 United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1097-98 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
10 Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supra note 5, at
1306 n.191.
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a company's stock was "solely for investment," even though the investor, in
making its purchase, had procured a contractual commitment from the target
company that its management would consult with the investor's sole shareholder
on management restructuring and major financial issues.10 4 The district court
held that this commitment to consult with the investor's principal was not inconsistent with a purchase "solely for investment" because the agreement mandating
consultation provided that "[n]othing in this section shall limit the absolute and
unfettered discretion of [the target] after such advice and consultation to act on
such matters in any manner it deems appropriate." 0 5 But providing advice and
consultation to a firm's management involves influencing managers' decisions
even if the managers are free to reject the proffered advice.1 06 Professor Elhauge's claim that "a stock acquisition can be solely for investment only if the
investor does not vote or otherwise influence corporate behavior at all" is thus
inconsistent with Tracinda. 0 7
Anaconda Co. v CraneCo., 08 which Professor Elhauge also cites, does not
support his view that purchasing stock "solely for investment" precludes voting
one's shares.1 09 In that case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that the buyer's planned purchase of22.6% of a company's stock
was solely for investment where the buyer promised not to buy any more of the
company's stock, seek representation on its board, or "vot[e] to bring about or
attempt to bring about a substantial lessening of competition."11o The investor
did not promise to refrain from voting entirely or to engage in only mirror voting; rather, it promised not to vote so as to achieve or attempt a "substantial
lessening of competition.""'1Thus, Anaconda in no way implies that merely voting one's shares negates investment-only intent.
A third case Professor Elhauge cites in support of his crabbed view of the
solely-for-investment element is United States v E.I du Pont de Nemours

Tracindalnv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. at 1100-01 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18).
Id. at 1101 (first alteration in original) (first quoting Plaintiff's Exhibit 262, atp. 5; then quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18).
106 Notably, both the president of the portfolio company and one of its board members "testified
that they w[ould] listen to [the shareholder's] advice and consultation." Id Yet, the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California concluded that "the stock acquisition in question was made solely
for investment purposes and was not made with any intent to take over active managerial control of
[the portfolio company], or for any purpose other than investment." Id.
10 7
Elhauge, HorizontalShareholdingHarm, supra note 14, at 256; see Tracindalnv. Corp., 477
F. Supp. at 1100-01.
108 Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1218-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
109 15 U.S.C. § 18; Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supra note 5, at 1306 n.191.
110 Anaconda Co., 411 F. Supp. at 1217.
104

1 5

1

"1 Id.
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Co.1 2 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a large block of a company's
stock (twenty-three percent) was not purchased "solely for investment.""1 3 According to Professor Elhauge, "the passive investment exception did not apply
because the investor tried to influence business decisions" of its portfolio company." 4 The Court's conclusion, however, did not rest on the mere fact that the
investor, du Pont, attempted to exert influence at the acquired firm, General Motors (GM).
Documents contemporaneous with du Pont's purchase showed that its objective in buying GM stock was not simply to earn investment income through
GM dividends, but also to enhance du Pont's own sales by convincing GM to
use du Pont as a supplier.1 5 The Court explained:
[B]efore the first block of General Motors stock was acquired, du
Pont was seeking markets [for various of its products] . . in demand
by the automobile companies. In that connection, the trial court expressly found that ".. . reports and other documents written at or near
the time of the investment show what du Pont's representatives were
well aware [of:] that General Motors was a large consumer of products of the kind offered by du Pont," and that John J. Raskob, du
Pont's treasurer and the principal promoter of the investment, "for
one, thought that du Pont would ultimately get all that business
,"116

Referencing a du Pont Treasurer's Report that recommended the GM stock purchase, the Court observed that "[t]hat report makes clear that more than just a
profitable investment was contemplated. A major consideration was that an expanding General Motors would provide a substantial market needed by the burgeoning du Pont organization.""17 The Court also pointed to du Pont shareholder
reports from the time of the purchase. Those reports echoed the point "that the
purchase [of GM stock] would result in du Pont's obtaining a new and substantial market" for its own products.1"8 The Court concluded that "[t]his background of the acquisition, particularly the plain implications of the contemporaneous documents, destroys any basis for a conclusion that the purchase was

12 Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supra note 5, at 1306 n.190 (citing EL du PontNemours
& Co., 353 U.S. at 597-606).
"3 E. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. at 602, 607 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18).
114 Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supra note 5, at 1306 (citing id. at 597-606).
115 E. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. at 600-02.
116 Id. at 600 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 F.
Supp. 235, 243
(N.D. Ill. 1954), rev'd, 353 U.S. 586 (1957)).
117
Id. at 601.
1
" Id. at 602.
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made 'solely for investment."11 9 Thus, du Pont holds only that stock bought
with the intent of using it to enhance the buyer's profits in anotherline of business could not have been purchased "solely for investment." 2 0 The case does
not suggest that merely "tr[ying] to influence business decisions" of the firm
whose stock was purchased is inconsistent with investment-only intent. 121
In addition to lacking support in the case law, Professor Elhauge's narrow
construal of the solely-for-investment element is inconsistent with the meaning
of the phrase "solely for the purpose of investment," which is used elsewhere in
the antitrust laws.' 2 2 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976-designed, as the title indicates, to improve the implementation ofthe antitrust laws (primarily Section 7 of the Clayton Act)-requires that certain major
purchases of business interests be reported to the government prior to their consummation.1 2 3 The Act posits reporting thresholds, 24 and it provides some statutory exemptions from its requirements.' 25 It also authorizes the FTC, with the
concurrence of DOJ, to define particular terms in the statute126 as well as to create certain additional regulatory exemptions for transactions "which are not likely to violate the antitrust laws." 2 7 Two of the Act's statutory exemptions apply
only if the transaction is "solely for the purpose of investment. "128 In addition,
the FTC has created two regulatory exemptions that similarly turn on whether
the purchase at issue was "solely for the purpose of investment. "129
119

Id.

120 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18).
121 See Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supra note 5, at 1306.
122 See infra notes 123-139 and accompanying text.
23 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (requiring persons
who plan to acquire "voting securities or assets" of another firm, absent an applicable exemption, to
file information with the federal antitrust agencies if the value of the acquired assets exceeds $50
million (in 2004 dollars) and the acquirer and target are sufficiently large).
124 Id. § 18a(a) (setting criteria for when reporting is required).
125 Id. § 18a(c) (creating exemptions from the reporting
requirement).
12 6
Id. § 18a(d)(2)(a) (authorizing the FTC and Department of Justice (DOJ) to "define the terms
used in this section").
127 Id § 18a(d)(2)(b) (authorizing the FTC and DOJ to "exempt, from the requirements of this
section, classes of persons, acquisitions, transfers, or transactions which are not likely to violate the
antitrust laws").
12
Id. § 18a(c)(9) (exempting "acquisitions, solely for the purpose of investment, of voting securities, if, as a result of such acquisition, the securities acquired or held do not exceed 10 per centum of
the outstanding voting securities of the issuer"); id. § 18a(c)(11) (exempting "acquisitions, solely for
the purpose of investment, by any bank, banking association, trust company, investment company, or
insurance company, of (A) voting securities pursuant to a plan of reorganization or dissolution; or (B)
assets in the ordinary course of its business").
129 16 C.F.R. § 802.9 (2020) (exempting "[a]n acquisition of voting securities . .
if made solely
for the purpose of investment and if, as a result of the acquisition, the acquiring person would hold ten
percent or less of the outstanding voting securities of the issuer, regardless of the dollarvalue of voting securities so acquired or held"); id § 802.64(b) (exempting certain purchases of voting securities
if "(1) [m]ade directly by an institutional investor; (2) [m]ade in the ordinary course of business; (3)
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For purposes of implementing these statutory and regulatory exemptions,
the FTC has exercised its statutory authority to define the phrase "solely for the
purpose of investment." It adopted a rule stating that "[v]oting securities are held
or acquired 'solely forthe purpose of investment' ifthe person holding or acquiring such voting securities has no intention of participating in the formulation,
determination, or direction of the basic business decisions of the issuer."130 I
promulgating that rule, the FTC explained that the purpose ofthe definition was
to limit the statutory and regulatory exemptions discussed above "to situations in
which the acquiring person or the holder has no intention of participating in the
management of the issuer."131 It expressly rejected the view that merely voting
one's shares (or intending to do so) would be inconsistent with purchasing "solely for the purpose of investment." It explained:
[C]omments were invited on the suggestion that this definition be further limited by requiring that stock purchased for investment purposes
not be voted. The comments . . were unanimously negative, arguing
that voting for directors, without more, was not inconsistent with investment purpose. The Commission has decided not to incorporate
this limitation into the final definition. Therefore, merely voting the
stock will not be considered evidence of an intent inconsistent with
investment purpose.1 32

If merely voting one's stock is not inconsistent, for purposes of the statute intended to improve Section 7, with having purchased the stock "solely for the
purpose of investment," then it hardly makes sense to say that such voting would
prevent a stock purchase from being "solely for investment" under Section 7
itself.
The understanding of "solely for investment" that emerges from the case
law and from the definition of a nearly identical phrase elsewhere in the antitrust
laws-that purchasing "solely for investment" requires the absence of any intent
to participate in management but does not preclude voting one's stock or offering non-binding advice to managers-aligns with the meaning of "investment"
in the federal securities laws. 133 Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securi-

[m]ade solely for the purpose of investment; and (4) [a]s a result of the acquisition the acquiring person would hold fifteen percent or less of the outstanding voting securities of the issuer").
oId. § 801.1(i)(1).
31 Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450,
33,465 (July 30, 1978) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 801-803).
132 Id.

133 Cf TracindaInv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. at 1101 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18) (finding that stock
purchase by a corporation whose sole shareholder had a contractual right to confer with the management of a portfolio company was solely for investment because the purchase "was not made with any
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ties Exchange Act of 1934 define the term "security" to include any "investment
contract."1 34 In 1946, the Supreme Court originally defined "investment contract" in Securities & Exchange Commission v WJ. Howey, Co. to mean "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party."1 35 The Court has since suggested that the expected profits need not
be solely from the efforts of others, observing that "the 'touchstone' of the
Howey test 'is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."'1 36 The ten circuit courts that have addressed the issue
have unanimously concluded that Howey's "solely" language is not to be literally construed and that the crux of the matter is whether the party contributing
money has meaningful control over the management ofthe enterprise generating
profits. 137
Additionally, when applying the test to limited liability company (LLC) interests, which sometimes qualify as investment contracts and sometimes do
not,1 38 courts have concluded that merely voting a minority share does not constitute sufficient management control to prevent the interest from being an investment contract.1 39 The implication is that voting a non-controlling interest,
intent to take overactive managerial control of [the portfolio company], or for any purpose otherthan
investment").
134 Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3, 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
135 SEC v. W.J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
136 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am.
v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551, 561 (1979) (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)).
137 Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240 n.4
(4th Cir.
1988); SEC v. Prof'l Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Goodwinv. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d
99, 103 (3d Cir. 1984); Kimv. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210, 213 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic
Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1982); Baurer v. Planning Grp., Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 779
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir. 1981); Aldrich v. McCulloch
Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912,
914-15 (8th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Glenn W. TumerEnters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,482 (9th Cir. 1973). The
remaining circuits have suggested agreement with their sister circuits. See SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d
42, 55 (1st Cir. 2001) (observing that "[t]he courts of appeals have been unanimous in declining to
give a literal meaning to the word 'solely"' in the definition of an investment contract, but not reaching the issue because the scheme under consideration involved profits "solely" from the efforts of
others); SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999) (adopting the Forman test that omits the strict "solely" requirement (referring to Forman, 421 U.S. at 852)).
13 See, e.g., Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2003) (declining to adopt categorical rule on whether LLC membership interests are investment contracts, and observing that answer will differ among companies depending on the degree of managerial control possessed by LLC
members).
139 See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 89-91 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that LLC
membership interests were securities even though members voted); Venezia Amos, LLC v. Favret,
No. 3:07cv146/MCR, 2008 WL 410163, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2008) (holding that LLC member-
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standing alone, is not the sort of management that transforms the purchase and
ownership of the interest into something beyond investment. Such understanding
coheres with the FTC's rule that voting alone will not prevent shares of stock
from being held "solely for the purpose of investment" and is inconsistent with
Professor Elhauge's view that mere voting will negate investment-only intent for
purposes of the solely-for-investment provision.
2. Not Using the Stock to Bring About, or in Attempting to Bring About, the
Substantial Lessening of Competition
Professor Elhauge's reading of the exemption's second element-the requirement that the investor not "us [e] the [purchased stock] by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of
competition"-is also flawed.1 4 0 He says that the requirement is not met, and the
exemption's protection is therefore lost, if an investor's stock purchase contributes to an actual "lessening of competition."141 That would mean that, even if an
investor purchased stock in competing firms "solely for investment," the investor could not escape liability under Section 7 if the overall pattern of common
ownership in the industry came to reduce competition and cause prices to rise.
Accordingly, economic evidence akin to the airline study could create liability
for intra-industry diversified investors even if they made each of their stock purchases "solely for investment." 142
ship interests were securities "[e]ven assuming that [a member] has voting rights and may inspect the
company's records"); Burnettv. Rowzee, No. SACV07-641 DOC (ANx), 2007 WL 2809769, at *3-5
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2007) (holding that LL C membership interests were securities even though members had a right to, and did, oust managerby majority vote); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab.
Co., 991 F. Supp. 6,7-8 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding that LLC membership interests were securities, even
though members voted on a potential acquisition of another company).
140 Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supra note 5, at 1309 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18).
141 15 U.S.C. § 18; Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supra note 5, at 1308 ("Whereas
an active
investment canbe condemned if it may substantially lessen competition, a passive investment canbe
condemned only if it actually does so or was intended to do so."); Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding
Harm, supra note 14, at 256 (asserting that purchasing stock "solely for investment . . changes the
standard of proof from 'may' substantially lessen competition to instead require evidence that the
stock acquisition was intended to have anticompetitive effects or actually has or likely would have
anticompetitive effects"). As explained above, courts have interpreted the phrase "may be substantially to lessen competition" in Section 7's substantive prohibitions to mean "is likely" to lessen competition substantially, so if purchasing solely for investment changes the standard for liability, it must
raise it to require actual or intended "lessening of competition." See 15 U.S.C. § 18; supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
142 15 U.S.C. § 18; Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supranote 5, at 1308 ("[E]ven if investors
who held horizontal stock were purely passive, proof that their horizontal shareholdings actually lessened competition, such as the Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu study showing that horizontal shareholdings
actually raised airline prices, would negate the passive investor exception and leave the horizontal
shareholders subject to challenge under [Section] 7 of the Clayton Act." (citing Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 31, at 1558-59)).
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This interpretation is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory
text. The second element of the solely-for-investment provision requires "not
using" purchased stock "to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition."1 43 Professor Elhauge interprets this language
to mean not causinga "substantial lessening of competition" with the stock purchase (or intending to do so). But "using" something "to bring about, or in attempting to bring about" some end connotes more than a mere causal relationship between the thing and the end at issue.1 44 For example, if a driver deliberately drove a car into a pedestrian, we would say the driver "used" the car "to
bring about" the pedestrian's injuries. By contrast, if the driver accidentally
dozed off and steered into a pedestrian, we might say that the car "caused" the
pedestrian's injuries, but we would not say the driver "used" the car "to bring
about" harm to the pedestrian. The verbal formula "use x to bring about y" signals more than just a causal relationship between x and y; it connotes the intentional availment of x for the purpose of achieving y.
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Leocal v. Ashcroft is instructive on this point.1 4 5 The Court addressed whether Florida's crime of driving
under the influence of alcohol (DUI), which included no mens rea element, was
a "crime of violence" as defined by 18 U.S.C. @ 16.146 That provision, enacted as
part ofthe Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, defined crime ofviolence
to include "an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." 47 The issue before the Court was "whether state DUI offenses similar to the one in Florida, which either do not have a mens rea component or require only a showing of
negligence in the operation of a vehicle, qualify as a crime of violence" under
@ 16.148 The issue required the Court to decide whether negligently or unintentionally causing injury by driving while intoxicated could still involve "the use
. . of physical force against the person or property of another" and thereby qualify as a crime of violence under the statute.1 49
The petitioner was an immigrant who had been deported for purportedly
committing a "crime of violence" by causing serious bodily injury by driving
under the influence of alcohol. He contended that the word "use" entails inten-

13 15 U.S.C.
144

§ 18.

Id.

145 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004).
146 Id. at 6-7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2018)).
147 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). The statute also includes in its definition "any other offense that is a felony
and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense." Id § 16(b).
148 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 3-4.
149 Id. at 6-7 (citing 18 U.S.C. §
16(a)).
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tional action." The Government argued otherwise, pointing to dictionary definitions, legislation, and even some other Supreme Court decisions suggesting that
"use" may be inadvertent or negligent.1 In resolving the interpretive dispute,
the Court explained:
Whether or not the word "use" alone supplies a mens rea element, the
parties' primary focus on that word is too narrow. Particularly when
interpreting a statute that features as elastic a word as "use," we construe language in its context and in light of the terms surrounding it.
The critical aspect of @ 16(a) is that a crime ofviolence is one involving the "use . . of physical force againstthe person or property of
another" . . As we said in a similar context[,] . . "use" requires active employment. While one may, in theory, actively employ something in an accidental manner, it is much less natural to say that a person actively employs physical force against another person by accident. Thus, a person would "use . . physical force against" another
when pushing him; however, we would not ordinarily say a person
"use[s] . . physical force against" another by stumbling and falling
into him. When interpreting a statute, we must give words their "ordinary or natural" meaning. The key phrase in @ 16(a)-the "use . . of
physical force against the person or property of another"-most naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct. Petitioner's DUI offense therefore is not a crime of
violence under @ 16(a).15 2
The interpretive lesson here is that the word "use" (or a variant thereof)
may imply intent by the actor and, to decide whether that is the case, one should
read the word "in its context and in light of the terms surrounding it" and then
ask whether its most "'ordinary or natural' meaning" entails intent.1 53 When a
statute refers to "using" something "to bring about" a particular outcome, the
most "'ordinary or natural' meaning" is that the actor actively employs the thing
with the intent of securing the outcome produced. 54 By contrast, the most "ordinary or natural" way to express Professor Elhauge's interpretation of the second
element would be to eschew the phrase "not using . . to bring about" in favor of
15

1 Id. ("Petitioner contends that his conviction did not require the 'use' of force against another
person because the most common employment of the word 'use' connotes the intentionalavailment of
force, which is not required under the Florida DUI statute.").
151
Id. at 7.
152 Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995); then
quoting Smithv. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993); and then quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)).
153 Id. (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at 228).
15 4
Id. (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at 228).
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language such as "not causing or attempting to cause" "the substantial lessening
of competition." Thus, the better reading of the second element ofthe solely-forinvestment provision as actually enacted is that it forbids actively employing
one's stock with the intent of lessening competition substantially. The mere fact
that one's stockholding contributes to a "lessening of competition," if the stockholder does not intend that outcome and actively employ the stock to achieve it,
will not prevent the exemption's second element from being satisfied.
C. The CorrectInterpretationof the Solely-for-Investment Exemption
andIts Implications for Mere Common Ownership
The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise misconstrues the solely-for-investment
provision because it wrongly equates a likely adverse effect on competition with
a non-investment purpose by the investor, and that error renders the provision a
nullity.5 5 Professor Elhauge correctly recognizes that the provision creates a
genuine exemption that will apply if two elements are satisfied, but he misconstrues each of those elements.1 56 Properly construed, the solely-for-investment
provision means the following:
Section 7's prohibition on stock acquisitions that may substantially lessen
competition in a market shall not apply if: (1) the investor purchased its stock
"solely for investment," meaning that (a) its only purpose in buying the stock
was to earn dividends or to profit from the stock's appreciation in value, not to
enhance profits from its own business operations, 5 7 and (b) the investor did not
intend to, or actually, exercise managerial control over the company at issue,
meaning that it could engage in activities typical of mere investors (for example,
it could vote a non-controlling percentage of shares or offer non-binding advice
to managers) but could not possess actual decision-making authority at the company (for example, it could not hold a management or director position at the
company or vote a controlling share of the company's stock); 5 8 and (2) the investor did not use the purchased stock to bring about, or in attempting to bring
about, the "substantial lessening of competition," meaning that it did not (a) exercise its rights as a shareholder, (b) with the specific intent of lessening competition.159
See discussion supra Part II.A.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
157 See supra notes 112-121 and accompanying text (discussing the du Pont Court's conclusion
that stock purchase was not "solely for investment" because the purchaser sought to use its influence
from investment to boost its own sales).
158 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
159 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. If an investor exercised its stockholder rights
withthe specific intent of lessening competition and succeeded in achieving that objective, it would have used the
stock "to bring about . .. the substantial lessening of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 18. If it did not suc155

156
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Under this correct interpretation of the solely-for-investment provision,
mere common ownership by an institutional investor will not violate Section 7,
even if it incidentally contributes to a lessening of market competition. The first
element of the exemption will be satisfied as long as (1) the institutional investor
holds a non-controlling share of each company's stock (so that it is engaged in
common, not cross-, ownership);1 60 (2) no agent or affiliate of the institutional
investor takes a management or directorial position at any of the competing portfolio companies (as doing so would mean that the investor is engaged in more
than mere common ownership); and (3) the stock was not purchased to earn noninvestment income (as in du Pont).161 The second element will be satisfied as
long as the institutional investor does not exercise its shareholder rights (for example, voting or offering non-binding advice) with the intent of inducing any
firm to compete less vigorously. Such intentional efforts to bring about a "lessening of competition" go beyond mere common ownership.
Critics may challenge this analysis on two grounds.1 62 First, they may contend that the first element of the solely-for-investment exemption is not satisfied
because a large institutional investor exercises de facto managerial control over
its portfolio firms. The theory of anticompetitive harm from common ownership
holds that corporate managers pursue the interests of their largest shareholders,
even when those shareholders own only a small percentage of the company's
stock, because the other shareholders are disorganized, poorly informed, and
consequently less likely to exert voting pressure on managers.1 63 In the words of
Posner et al., "someone must determine the firms' goals. That controller is likely
to be one of the largest shareholders. If there are no large concentrated shareholders, then the firm will likely be run in the interests of its institutional investors even if these do not individually own very large stakes."1 64 If an institutional
investor necessarily exerts control over managerial decision making, then it
could not have purchased its stock "solely for investment."165
It is unlikely, though, that an institutional investor engaged in mere common ownership actually holds the sway that Posner et al. suppose it does. If the
ceed in lessening competition, it still would have used the stock "in attempting to bring about[] the
substantial lessening of competition." Id.
160 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (distinguishing "cross[-]ownership" and
"common
ownership").
161 See supra notes 112-121 and accompanying text (explaining that du Pont's purchase of GM
stock was not "solely for investment" because its motivation for purchase was to induce GM to purchase du Pont components).
162 See infra notes 163-176 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 684-85.
Golden GrainMacaroniCo., 78 F.T.C. at 73 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18) ("[W]hen an acquisition will necessarily affect the competitive behavior of the two involved firms, it cannot be said that
the sole purpose of the acquisition was for investment.").
164
165
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institutional investor has not assumed a management position and owns only the
percentage typically held by a large mutual fund provider (less than 10% of voting securities), it can seldom determine the outcome of a shareholder vote. A
recent analysis of proxy voting at the companies included in the Russell 3000
Index, a broad-based index comprised of the 3,000 largest U.S. public companies by market capitalization, revealed that votes are rarely so close that an institutional investor could alter the outcome by changing its vote. 166 In director elections, fewer than 1% of outcomes would have changed if a 10% shareholder had
switched its vote, and only 5% would have come out differently if three 10%
shareholders had changed their votes in the same direction.1 67 For votes on executive compensation packages ("say-on-pay"), only 3% of outcomes would have
changed if a 10% investor switched its vote, and only 13% would have changed
if three shareholders of that size had done so uniformly.1 68 For votes related to
mergers and acquisitions,1 69 a switch by a 10% shareholder would have altered
the outcome in only 1% of votes, and a concerted switch by three 10% shareholders would have changed only 5% of vote outcomes. 70 For shareholder proposals, which comprised a mere 2% of ballot items at Russell 3000 firms, institutional investors could have more sway.' 7' In 23% of shareholder proposal
votes, a changed vote by a single 10% investor would have altered the outcome,
and a uniform vote change by three 10% shareholders could have altered the
vote outcome in 67% of shareholder proposal votes. 7 2 The data also revealed,
however, that the major institutional investors often vote differently on shareholder proposals.1 73 For example, State Street supported 33% of shareholder
proposals, while Vanguard voted affirmatively only 15% of the time. 7 4 It does
not seem, then, that institutional investors vote as a block on shareholder proposals. These data suggest that an institutional investor engaged in mere com-

166 See BLACKROCK, PROXY VOTING OUTCOMES: BY THE NUMBERS 1 (2019), https://www.

blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/policy-spotlight-proxy-voting-outcomes-by-the-numbersapril-2019.pdf [https://penna.cc/F7E6-WXC8].
167

Id.

Id. at 2 (observing that "during the 2017-2018 proxy season, 79% of say-on-pay proposals
were approved with greater than 90% support by all shareholders and 87% were won by margins
greater than 30%. Only 3% of say-on-pay proposals were won or lost by a margin of 10% or less").
169 The category of mergers and acquisitions-related ("M&A-related") votes includes both votes
to approve a merger or acquisition and votes to authorize the financing for such a transaction. Id.
17 0
Id. (observing that "93% of M&A-related votes during the 2017-2018 proxy season received
90% or more support and only one transaction (1%) was passed within a margin of 10% or less [..
3
and,] [l]ikewise, less than 5% of transactions passed within a 0% margin").
17 1
Id. at 3.

.

168

172

Id.

173

Id.
Id.
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mon ownership, whose only actual "management" consists of voting its shares,
will not have de facto managerial control over its portfolio firms.
Second, critics may contend that the second element of the solely-forinvestment exemption is not satisfied by an institutional investor engaged in
mere common ownership. They would argue that an investor holding shares in
competing firms likely lessens competition, as the airline and banking studies
purportedly reveal, and the investor should be taken to "intend" the likely effects
of its actions. 7 5 Thus, an institutional investor that receives dividends from
competing portfolio firms or votes its shares is exercising its shareholder rights
with the intent of lessening competition and is thus "using . . [its stock] to bring
about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition"
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.1 76
Even if one assumes that mere common ownership does have the likely effect of lessening competition substantially, a point not conceded here, 7 7 there
are two problems with this reasoning.1 78 First, it would be improper in this context to presume that the probable effect must have been intended by those causing it. Presuming that an actor intended the likely effect of the actor's conduct
may be appropriate when the actor knows, or at least has reason to know, that the
effect is indeed likely to follow from those actions. 179 But when an actor is not
privy to the information needed to predict the effect of the actor's conduct, the
mere fact that the effect was likely to result from that behavior does not suggest
that actor intended, when acting, to bring about that effect. That is the situation
with common ownership.
The theory that common ownership lessens competition, and the empirical
studies purporting to support it, assume that corporate managers attempt to maximize the control-weighted portfolio returns of their investors.1 80 In other words,
a manager considers all the stockholdings of the company's investors, deter-

175 This resembles the position taken by the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise. See supra notes 62-68
and accompanying text. This position is somewhat different because the treatise reasons that likely
anticompetitive effect prevents a stock purchase from being "solely for investment" (element one of
the exemption), whereas the claim here is that a likely "lessening of competition" negates the second
element of the exemption (not exercising one's stockholder rights with the intent of "lessening competition") because a stockholder constructively intends the likely effect of its actions. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 18; supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
176
1
"?

15 U.S.C. § 18.

See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 233-48 (criticizing theory and evidence of anticompetitive harm from common ownership).
178 See infra notes 179-185 and accompanying
text.
179 Even this is doubtful. See, e.g., Cominelli v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 589
F. Supp. 2d 706, 716-17 (W.D. Va. 2008) ("Mere knowledge of a possible result of certain actions,
without more, cannot constitute an intentional interference.").
18
" See O'Brien & Waehrer, supra note 46, at 739, 742-43 (explaining logic of MHHIA, the metric used to assess incentives to reduce competition).
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mines what competitive strategies would maximize the overall portfolio returns
ofthe different investors, weights those potential strategies according to the control each investor exerts over the manager's company (i.e., a large shareholder's
preferred strategy gets more weight than that preferred by a small shareholder),
and causes the company to pursue whatever strategy dominates.181 Whether an
investor's common ownership is likely to cause a company to pull its competitive punches therefore depends on how that company's stock is distributed
among its investors andthe composition of those investors' portfolios. Because
an investor-even a sophisticated institutional investor-would not know who
else owns company stock, how much they own, and which other companies they
are invested in, it would have no reason to know whether its purchase or continued holding of stock would be likely to cause a "substantial lessening of competition." Even ifthe investor's purchase or continued holding were likely to lessen
competition substantially, it would be inappropriate to presume that the investor-ignorant ofthe facts that would demonstrate such likelihood-intended that
probable effect. And absent such intent, the investor could not be "using the
[stock] . . to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition" and would not lose the protection of the solely-forinvestment provision.1 82
A second reason for rejecting, in this context, the presumption that an actor
intends the likely effects of its actions is that the presumption would render the
solely-for-investment provision a nullity. Under Section 7's substantive prohibitions in its first two paragraphs, a stock acquisition or holding that makes a "substantial lessening of competition" likely triggers liability. 8 3 If "using" connotes
intentional availment and an investor is taken to intend the likely effects of its
stockholding, then at the precise moment a "substantial lessening of competition" becomes probable the investor is "using . . [its stock] to bring about, or in
attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition."18 4 If that is
so, then at the very moment liability would be triggered under the substantive
prohibition of Section 7 (because the investor acquired or held stock when doing

181 As economists Daniel P. O'Brien and Keith Waehrer explain, the theory of anticompetitive
harm from common ownership

assume [s] that each firm's manager maximizes a weighted sum of the owners' financial
returns, which include the owners' earnings through their financial interests in other
firms in the same market. The weight that a manager assigns to each owner's profit can
be interpreted as a measure of the degree of control or influence the owner has over
firm management.
Id at 739.
182 15 U.S.C. § 18 (emphasis added).
183 Id.
184 td.
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so would be likely to lessen competition), the investor would lose its protection
under the solely-for-investment exemption (because it would be "using . . [its
stock] in [an] attempt[] to bring about . . [a] "lessening of competition"). And in
that case, the solely-for-investment exemption is pointless: it could never insulate anyone from liability, the legal outcome under Section 7 would be the same
whether or not the provision was included in the statute, and the provision would
be mere surplusage. The better view, then, is that "using" stock "to bring about,
or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition" requires
an actual, not constructive, intent to reduce competition.1 85
III. SECTION

1

OF THE SHERMAN ACT

Recognizing that "doubts have been raised about whether Clayton Act
[Section] 7 can tackle horizontal shareholding . . because of the solely-forinvestment exception,"1 86 Professor Elhauge also contends that "horizonal
shareholding that has anticompetitive effects can be tackled under the Sherman
Act as an ongoing contract or combination that restrains competition."1 87 The
basis for liability would be Section 1 of the Sherman Act,1 88 which is violated
when (1) the defendant enters a "contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy" (i.e., an agreement); and (2) that agreement unreasonably restrains trade.1 89 Professor Elhauge asserts that if mere common ownership
softens competition and thereby reduces market output, it unreasonably restrains
trade. In arguing that mere common ownership entails the requisite "contract,
combination[,] . . or conspiracy," Professor Elhauge offers two theories.1 90
A. The ShareholderContractTheory
Professor Elhauge first argues that the agreement element of a Section 1
claim is satisfied by the implicit contract that results from an investor's stock

185 Id.
186 Elhauge, HorizontalShareholdingHarm, supra note 14, at 268.
187 Id.

188 15 U. S.C. § 1 (2018) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.").
189 Id Because most contracts involve a literal "restraint of trade," the U.S. Supreme Court has
interpreted Section 1 of the Sherman Act to forbid only those contracts that unreasonably restrain
trade by reducing overall market output. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (observing that "the Court has never taken a literal approach" to Section 1
and has "repeated time and again that [Section] 1 outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints" (second
alteration in original) (first quoting Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); then quoting State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997))).
190 15 U.S.C. §
1.
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purchase (the "shareholder contract").191 In buying a corporation's stock, an investor provides the corporation with capital in exchange for a continuing share
of the corporation's profits and the right to vote on such key decisions as who
will direct the company's business.1 92 Although Professor Elhauge concedes that
no individual shareholder contract restrains trade, he maintains that the aggregate effect of all an institutional investor's shareholder contracts in an industry
(for example, Vanguard's shareholder contracts with each separate airline) together with those of other intra-industry diversified investors (for example, the
shareholder contracts each airline has with BlackRock, State Street, and Fidelity)
is to reduce the incentive of firms within the industry to expand output and reduce prices, resulting in an unreasonable restraint oftrade.1 93 Professor Elhauge
maintains that antitrust tribunals regularly aggregate contract effects this way
when assessing the legality of challenged practices. 194 He points specifically to
exclusive dealing cases, where the legality of a challenged agreement may turn
on the cumulative foreclosure occasioned by all the exclusive dealing contracts
in a market, and to resale price maintenance (what Professor Elhauge calls "vertical price-fixing contracts"), where courts consider whether the practice is sufficiently widespread among market participants to facilitate price coordination. 195
There are two problems with this analysis.1 96 First, the implicit contract between a shareholder and the corporation wherein it is invested is not a contract
"in restraint of trade or commerce."1 97 The basic shareholder contract does not
191 Elhauge, HorizontalShareholdingHarm, supra note 14, at 269-70. This
also seems to be the
position espoused by Professors Scott Morton and Hovenkamp, who assert that "the 'agreement' requirement [of Section 1] applies to the stock acquisition, not to the subsequent use, and is present
whether or not the interest is controlling. The 'restraint of trade' standard does not require control, but
only that the arrangement serves to reduce output and raise price." Scott Morton & Hovenkamp, supra
note 7, at 2035-36. Because a mere acquisition of a non-controlling stock interest would not reduce
output, raise prices, or otherwise restrain trade, Professors Scott Morton and Hovenkamp must have in
contemplation not simply the purchase of stock, but the implicit shareholder contract resulting from its
acquisition.
192 Elhauge, Horizontal ShareholdingHarm, supra note 14, at 269 ("The 'contract' element is
clearly met because horizontal shareholding involves formal contracts between corporations and
common investors. Those contracts are what give horizontal shareholders rights to vote for corporate
management and a share of corporate profits.").
193
Id. (acknowledging that "each individual shareholder-corporate contract would not, standing
alone, restrain competition," but asserting that "[i]t suffices that the horizontal shareholders have contracts with competing firms and that the effect of the voting and profit rights in those contracts is to
lessen competition between those firms").
194 Id.
19 5
Id. ("Antitrust has long judged the anticompetitive effects of multiple contracts based on their
aggregate impact, such as when it judges exclusive dealing contracts based on cumulative foreclosure
or vertical price-fixing contracts based on whether they are sufficiently widespread to facilitate oligopolistic coordination.").
196 See infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
197

15 U.S.C. § 1.
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prevent or discourage any transactions that otherwise would have occurred. Professor Elhauge attempts to get around this problem by asserting that a trade restraint occurs when all the shareholder contracts of all the investors that are diversified within an industry are aggregated. But antitrustlaw does not aggregate
the effects of non-trade-restraining contracts to produce a restraint of trade.
Courts sometimes aggregate the effects of individual trade-restraining contracts-for example, exclusive dealing agreements that restrain one party from
trading with others,1 98 resale price maintenance agreements that restrain a party
from selling a product below a particularprice-to determine whether the trade
restraint a particular contract effects is unreasonable.1 99 They do not, however,
aggregate the effects of different parties' non-trade-restraining contracts to produce a trade restraint in the first instance.
More importantly, courts should not treat the basic shareholder contract as a
Section 1 agreement because doing so would so drastically expand Section l's
reach that it would undermine a basic principle of antitrust law. Professor Elhauge reasons as follows: (1) ownership of corporate stock involves a contract
(i.e., the shareholder agrees to provide capital in exchange for a promise of dividends and the right to vote); (2) intra-industry diversified investors' shareholder
contracts, taken together, lead corporate managers to reduce output and raise
prices; (3) therefore, an intra-industry diversified investor's shareholder contracts with its portfolio firms are contracts that unreasonably restrain trade in
violation of Section 1.200
Under this reasoning, every exercise of market power by a for-profit corporation would violate Section 1. A corporation's profits, and thus the dividends
paid to its shareholders, grow when the company exercises market power. Professor Elhauge's Section 1 theory of liability would therefore apply any time a
corporation exercised market power, because shareholders and corporate managers would have (1) entered contracts that (2) induced the managers to cut back
on output to raise profits, and (3) thereby effected an unreasonable restraint of
trade. For example, any time a brand name prescription drug manufacturer
charged a supracompetitive price for its patented product in an effort to enhance
shareholder returns, there would be a contract that unreasonably restrains trade

198 See, e.g., FTC v. Motion Picture Advert. Serv. Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 392, 393, 395 (1953) (finding anticompetitive effects because the exclusive dealing agreements of the four firms produced an
aggregate foreclosure of 75%); Standard Oil Co. of Ca. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295, 309, 314
(1949) (upholding a finding of anticompetitive effects for similar agreements among seven leading oil
producers that resulted in an aggregate foreclosure of 65%).
199 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 897 (observing that "[r]esale price
maintenance should be subject to more careful scrutiny, by contrast, if many competing manufacturers
adopt the practice").
200 See Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14,
at 269-71.
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and thus a Section 1 violation. 20 1 It is a bedrock principle of antitrust law,
though, that corporations do not violate the Sherman Act merely by charging
supracompetitive prices or otherwise exercising their legitimately obtained market power. 202

The U.S. Supreme Court has warned against adopting broad interpretations
of "contract, combination[,] . . or conspiracy" that would expand Sherman Act
liability in this fashion. 203 In CopperweldCorp. v Independence Tube Corp., the
Court held that there could be no Section 1 agreement between a corporation and
its wholly owned subsidiary. 204 The Court emphasized that a robust agreement
requirement is necessary to preserve the basic structure of the Sherman Act. 205
The Court observed that Section 1 liability requires something not required for
liability under Section 2 (an agreement), 206 while Section 2 includes an element
missing from Section 1 (market power). 207 The Court then noted that allowing
Section l's agreement element to be satisfied by any technical agreement-for
example, between a parent and its subsidiary or between multiple officials of a
single firm-could cause unilateral firm conduct to violate the Sherman Act under Section 1 even if the acting firm lacked market power so that it could not

201 Section 1 of the Sherman Act would also be violated any time a corporation withdrew from a
market, or cut back on product features or services some consumers desire, at shareholder behest.
Consider the Episcopal Church's recent campaign to persuade the companies in which it is invested to
take actions it believes are morally required. See G. Jeffrey MacDonald, Investingfor an Impact, THE
LIVING CHURCH (Nov. 4, 2019), https://livingchurch.org/2019/11/04/investing-for-an-impact/ [https://
perma.cc/J4JH-M2NS]. The denomination purchased stock in gun manufacturers with the hope of
inducing corporate managers to eliminate design features that may increase the risk of mass shootings.
Id. A prominent parish also sought to persuade retail giant Wal-Mart to remove assault weapons from
its shelves. See Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 328-29 (3d Cir. 2015). If
these Episcopal shareholders succeed in their efforts either by making a shareholder proposal or setting forth a compelling argument at a shareholder meeting, there would be an unreasonable restraint of
trade (a reduction in market output) occasioned by a shareholder contract. Under Professor Elhauge' s
view, the ecclesiastical shareholders and the companies responding to their requests would violate
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
202 See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447-48 (2009) (observing
that "[s]imply possessing monopoly power and charging monopoly prices does notviolate [Sherman
Act Section] 2"); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,407
(2004) (observing that "[t]he mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of
monopoly prices, is . . . not unlawful").
203 15 U.S.C. §
1.
204 Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
205
Id. at 767-71.
2 06
Id. at 768 ("Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in contrast, reaches unreasonable restraints of trade
effected by a contract, combination[,] . . . or conspiracy between separate entities. It does not reach
conduct that is wholly unilateral." (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1; then
quoting Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 149, 149 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co., 522 U.S. 3
(1977))).
2 07
Id. at 767 ("The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone and is unlawful only when it
threatens actual monopolization.").

Boston College Law Review

2952

[Vol. 6 1:29

13

violate Section 2.208 The Court reasoned that Section l's agreement element
should not be interpreted so broadly as to disrupt the fundamental structure of
the Sherman Act. 209 By the same token, courts should not interpret "contract,
combination[,] . . or conspiracy" in a way that would undermine the longstanding precept that the mere exercise of market power by a corporation is not
an antitrust violation.21 0

B. The Analogy to Historic Trusts and Holding Companies
Professor Elhauge also argues that mere common ownership satisfies the
agreement element of a Section 1 claim because an investor's ownership of
stock of competing companies is a "combination" analogous to the historic trusts
(expressly recognized in Section 1 as qualifying combinations), 21' and to illegal
holding companies.2 1 2 With the historic trusts, shareholders of competing companies deposited their shares into a trust, allowing them to be collectively managed by the trustee to maximize industry profits.213 In exchange for their shares,
shareholders received trust certificates entitling them to a portion of the trust's
profits, which were larger because of the reduced competition among firms within the industry.2 1 4 With illegal holding companies, shareholders of competing
firms (the eventual subsidiaries) exchanged their shares for shares of a holding
company, which could control the subsidiaries and cause them not to compete,
thereby enhancing their aggregate profits.2 15 Those profits were then distributed
to the holding company's shareholders. According to Professor Elhauge:
[A]ntitrust treatment of both trusts and holding corporations establishes that showing a horizontal agreement or combination does not
require proving a direct agreement between two competing firms, but
rather can be proven through shareholder contracts between each firm
and common horizontal shareholders that indirectly link those two
competing firms. Accordingly, when a common set of institutional investors are leading shareholders at competing firms, the shareholder
contracts between those firms and their common horizontal share208

Id. at 770-77.

20 9

Id. at 775 (observing that Congress imposed different requirements for liability under Sections

1 and 2 for "eminently sound reasons" and that "[s]ubjecting a single firm's every action to judicial
scrutiny for reasonableness would threaten to discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the antitrust
laws seek to promote").
210 See supra note 204 and accompanying
text.
21115 U.S.C. § 1 (forbidding every unreasonable "combination in the form of trust or otherwise").
212 Elhauge, HorizontalShareholdingHarm, supra note 14, at 269-72.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215

Id. at 269-71.
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holders also satisfy the contract or combination requirement of Sherman Act [Section] 1.216

'

This attempt to analogize mere common ownership to the historic trusts
and illegal holding companies fails fortwo reasons. First, both the historic trusts
and the holding companies that violated Section 1 involved a combination of
controllinginterests in competing firms. With the trusts, the trustee held all or
nearly all of the stock of participating firms and thus combined control of each
of them within a single entity.217 Similarly, the creation of holding companies
was condemned under Section 1 when the parent company took a majority interest in multiple competing subsidiaries and thereby gained the ability to control
them in a way that would lessen market competition. 2 18 Combining control of
multiple competing firms into a single entity "deprives the marketplace of the
independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands." 2 19 But mere common ownership (as opposed to cross-ownership) involves an investor's combining of only non-controllinginterests in competing
firms.220 Accordingly, it does not reduce the number of "independent centers of
decisionmaking" in a market the way the historic trusts and illegal holding companies did.22

216

Id. at 270.

See Wayne D. Collins, Trusts andthe OriginsofAntitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2279, 2316 (2013) (observing that "[t]he 1882 Standard Oil Trust, which became the model for other
trusts . . was joined by all of the stockholders and members of fourteen corporations and limited
partnerships, the controlling stockholders and members of an additional twenty-six corporations and
limited partnerships, and forty-six individuals" (footnote omitted)).
21 See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 322 (1904) (explaining that the condemned
holding company had taken "the capital stock, or a controlling interest in the capital stock, of each of
the constituent railway companies"). The Supreme Court also observed that the condemned holding
company "ha[d] become the holder more properly speaking, the custodian of more than ninetenths of the stock of the Northern Pacific, and more than three-fourths of the stock of the Great
Northern" railroads. Id at 326. Professor Elhauge cites this case to support his position. See Elhauge,
HorizontalShareholdingHarm, supra note 14, at 270 n.310 (citing id. 325-27).
219 Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 769.
220 See supra note 1 and accompanying
text.
221 Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 769. In 1984, in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., the Court emphasized that:
217

[I]n any [Section 1] conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own
interests separately are combining to act as one fortheir commonbenefit. This not only
reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimedbut suddenly increases the economic power moving in one particular direction.
Id. Combining the non-controlling interests of two companies, by contrast, does not preclude those
companies from "pursu[ing] their own interests separately," entail their "combining to act as one for
their common benefit," "reduce[] the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed," or "increase[] the economic power moving in one particular direction." Id.
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Professor Elhauge's analogies also fail because the historic trusts and illegal holding companies, unlike mere common ownership, involved agreements
beyond the basic shareholder contract.222 With the historic trusts, the constituent
firms themselves agreed to consolidate using the trust form. As Wayne D. Collins has documented, the firms adopted the trust as their means of combination
because the common law at the time would have enforced neither an inter-firm
contract to limit competition 2 23 nor a pooling agreement between the competing
firms,224 and the firms could not simply adopt a unitary ownership structure (for
example, some kind of holding corporation) because prevailing corporation law
restricted the corporate form in ways that made it unworkable as a combination
structure. 225 In addition to these inter-firm agreements, the trusts involved
agreements between the shareholders of participant firms: each firm's shareholders agreed to deposit their shares into the trust on the condition that the
shareholders of competing firms did the same so that the combined stock could
be managed to encourage industry profit maximization. 22 6 Professor Elhauge is
thus wrong when he writes that "the only thing combining the firms [in the historic trusts was] the fact that their shareholder rights [were] held by a common
horizontal investor, namely the trust."227 In fact, firms participating in the trusts
were combined by agreements among themselves and among their shareholders.
Holding companies that have been deemed illegal combinations under Section 1 have also involved agreements between the shareholders of different portfolio firms. In the holding company condemned in Northern Securities, Co. v
UnitedStates, for example, the stockholders of the portfolio railroads collaborated with each other in concocting a scheme to enhance their collective returns. 228
As explained above, the implicit contract between a stockholder and the company that it is
invested in (i.e., the shareholder's provision of capital in exchange forthe promise of dividends and a
limited voting right) does not count as a "contract, combination[,] .. .or conspiracy" for purposes of
Section 1. 15 U.S.C. § 1; see supra notes 192-210 and accompanying text.
223 Collins, supra note 217, at 2293-2307.
222

22

4 Id. at 2307-09.

225

Id. at 2309-15.
Id. at 2316 (observing that "[t]he 1882 agreement [creating the Standard Oil trust] was joined
by all of the stockholders and members of fourteen corporations and limited partnerships, the controlling stockholders and members of an additional twenty-six corporations and limited partnerships, and
forty-six individuals, all of whom would be the beneficiaries of the trust").
227 Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 270. Professor Elhauge is also
wrong in stating that "antitrust treatment of . . trusts . . establishes that showing a horizontal agreement or combination does not require proving a direct agreement between two competing firms." Id.
There were agreements between the rival firms in the trusts.
22
s N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 326. The Court explained:
22 6

[Ilt is indisputable upon this record that . . the stockholders of the Great Northern and
Northern Pacific Railway corporations, having competing and substantially parallel
lines[,] ... combined andconceived the scheme oforganizing a corporationunder the
laws of New Jersey, which should hold the shares of the stock of the constituent com-
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With mere common ownership, there are no agreements between the competing portfolio firms (as with the historic trusts) or between the shareholders of
different competing firms (as with both the trusts and the holding companies
whose creation violated Section 1). Take, for example, the airline industry. Even
if institutional investors' common ownership of airlines has lessened market
competition (a point not conceded here), 229 there is no evidence that the airlines
have agreed to act in concert or to pursue a common ownership structure (as the
firms in the historic trusts did), or that the institutional investors holding stock in
multiple airlines have agreed to press the companies to reduce competition
among themselves (as did the shareholders of firms in the trusts and in illegal
holding companies). The only "agreements" among the individuals and entities
in the airline industry are the basic shareholder agreements between investors
and each of their portfolio firms, which, for reasons set forth above, are not cognizable Section 1 agreements. 230 Rather, they are intra-enterprise agreements
between capital providers and managers.
Proponents of imposing Section 1 liability on the basis of mere common
ownership may respond that, even when intra-industry diversified institutional
investors do not hold controlling shares of their portfolio firms, they still exercise de facto control over those firms because firm managers defer to the interests of their largest shareholders, all of which are intra-industry diversified.231
Thus, common ownership results in a combination of effective controlling interests in competing companies, just as the historic trusts and illegal holding companies combined controlling stakes of separate rivals.
The problem with this reasoning is that mere common ownership does not
amalgamate de facto controlling interests within any single entity or group of
collaborating entities. No single institutional investor combines de facto controlling interests, for the common ownership literature asserts that a softening of
panies, such shareholders, in lieu of their shares in those companies, to receive, uponan
agreed basis of value, shares in the holding corporation; that pursuantto such combination the Northern Securities Company was organized as the holding corporation
through which the scheme should be executed; and under that scheme such holding
corporation has become the holder more properly speaking, the custodian-of more
than nine-tenths of the stock of the Northern Pacific, and more thanthree-fourths of the
stock of the Great Northern, the stockholders of the companies who delivered their
stock receiving upon the agreed basis shares of stock in the holding corporation.
Id. (first and third emphasis added).
229 See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 233-48 (criticizing the theory and evidence of anticompetitive harm from common ownership).
230 See supra Part III.A. and accompanying text.
231 See, e.g., Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 684-85 ("[S]omeone must determine the
firms' goals. That controller is likely to be one of the largest shareholders. If there are no large concentrated shareholders, then the firm will likely be run in the interests of its institutional investors
even if these do not individually own very large stakes.").
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competition results from the overall pattern of stock ownership among all the
investors in the industry-for example, from the fact that multiple large investors are intra-industry diversified and there are no shareholders holding large
blocks of single firms within the industry. 232 It is no answer to say that intraindustry diversified institutional investors as a group have combined de facto
controlling interests because there is no evidence of any agreement among institutional investors to work together as a group in managing the stock that they
collectively own.233
Proponents of Section 1 liability may retort that the absence of any such
agreement is inconsequential because intra-industry diversified institutional investors act in parallel to pursue industry profit maximization and a lessening of
market competition. But it is well-established in antitrust law that mere parallel
conduct cannot establish an agreement for purposes of Section 1 when each individual firm has an incentive to act as it does, regardless of what the other firms
do. 234 This principle would apply to intra-industry diversified institutional investors. Parallel conduct cannot establish a Section 1 agreement absent a "conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective."235 There is no evidence that institutional investors have consciously committed to act in concert in causing their portfolio firms to pursue industry profit
maximization. Accordingly, there is no "group" of institutional investors who
have collectively combined de facto controlling interests in competing firms.

232 See id. at 683-84 (explaining logic of MHHIA, which purports to measure competitionlessening incentives resulting from overall pattern of ownership in an industry). Evenwith significant
common ownership by multiple investors, the holding of large blocks by investors who are not intraindustry diversified will, according to the theory, prevent competition-softening. Id at 684 (discussing
effect of blockholders).
233 Professor Elhauge appears to have in mind a combination of interests within such a group of
shareholders when he writes that "a horizontal agreement or combination . . can be proven through
shareholder contracts between each firm and common horizontal shareholdersthat indirectly link
those . . competing firms." Elhauge,HorizontalShareholdingHarm, supra note 14, at 270 (emphasis
added). He further asserts that "when a common set ofinstitutionalinvestors are leading shareholders
at competing firms, the shareholder contracts betweenthose firms and their common horizontal shareholders also satisfy the contract or combination requirement of Sherman Act [Section] 1."Id. (emphasis added).
234 Compare Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1954)
(holding that the parallel conduct did not establish agreement where each firm had independent incentive to act as it did, regardless of competitors' actions), with Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,
306 U.S. 208, 221-27 (1939) (holding that the agreement could be inferred from consciously parallel
conduct that would have been economically irrational if engaged in unilaterally).
235 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (quoting Edward J.
Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980)).
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IV. WHY ANTITRUST CONDEMNATION OF MERE COMMON OWNERSHIP
WOULD LIKELY REDUCE SOCIAL WELFARE

Thus far, this Article's analysis has been legal and descriptive: it has shown
why neither Section 7 of the Clayton Act nor Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemn mere common ownership. Next, this Article considers why, as a normative
matter, that is a good thing. In short, those who call for condemning mere common ownership under the antitrust laws have not shown that the marginal benefits of such condemnation are likely to exceed the marginal costs it would entail.
Courts and enforcers should thus refrain, at least on the current record, from
adopting aggressive interpretations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 1
of the Sherman Act to preclude mere common ownership.
The marginal benefit of condemning mere common ownership would be
the elimination of anticompetitive harms (i.e., allocative inefficiencies from supracompetitive pricing) that result from the practice. On the current record, we
have no idea of the magnitude of those harms and thus ofthe benefit of eliminating them. To be sure, the studies purporting to show harms from common ownership have estimated adverse price effects ofthe practice. The airline study, for
example, concluded that airfares are 3% to 7% higher because of current levels
of common ownership.236 Likewise, the banking study found that a one standard
deviation increase in the common ownership metric raised fees on interestbearing checking accounts by 11% and increased the minimum balance required
to avoid fees by 17%.237 The trustworthiness ofthose studies, however, is a matter of dispute as they have been criticized on methodological grounds, 238 and
other studies have reached contrary conclusions. 239
More importantly for our purposes, the studies have not attempted to quantify the adverse effects of mere common ownership, and they therefore tell us
nothing about the marginal benefit of expanding the scope of the antitrust laws to
condemn it. As explained above, the studies that purport to show harm from horizontal shareholding correlate some measure of common ownership of the firms
in a market-MHHIA or a variant thereof-with price effects in that market.2 10
In so doing, the studies have lumped together all instances of common ownership: those accompanied by anticompetitive agreements (for example, hub-andspoke conspiracies, collaborations among common investors to encourage industry profit maximization), and those where no such agreements are present. This
is understandable, as it would be extremely difficult for researchers to know

236

See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.

237 See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
238 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
239
240

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
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when common ownership involved additional anticompetitive agreements and
when it did not. But the failure to segregate instances of mere common ownership from "common ownership plus anticompetitive agreement" implies that the
common ownership studies cannot give a sense of the added social benefit that
would result from policing the former. It could be that most of the alleged welfare loss from common ownership could be eliminated simply by stepping up
enforcement against anticompetitive agreements that may emerge when there is
substantial common ownership of firms in concentrated industries. If that is the
case, the marginal benefits of expanding antitrust to condemn mere common
ownership could be small.
In any event, the efficiency gain from eliminating the slight price increases
allegedly shown to result from common ownership is the upper limit of the potential marginal benefit from condemning mere common ownership. If critics are
correct that the common ownership studies have overstated the social harms of
horizontal shareholding, or if such harms could be reduced by simply stepping
up enforcement against actual anticompetitive agreements (common ownership
"plus"), then the marginal benefits of condemning mere common ownership will
be less than the quantum of harm purportedly demonstrated by the common
ownership studies.
Although it is unclear whether condemning mere common ownership
would secure significant marginal benefits, it would almost certainly entail substantial marginal costs. Assuming that institutional investors continue to hold
stocks of multiple firms competing in concentrated markets, there would be the
costs of deciding whether an instance of common ownership violates the law.
Such "decision costs" would be borne by enforcers in deciding whether to challenge instances of common ownership, by adjudicators in determining whether
to assign liability, and by business planners in determining whether the conduct
under consideration is legally permitted. For all three groups, the decision costs
of a rule condemning mere common ownership would be significant.
To see why, consider the likely circumstances wherein mere common ownership would be condemned. Because many instances of the practice entail no
competitive threat,perse condemnation would be inappropriate,24 1 and antitrust
liability would presumably attach only where product market concentration and
the overall pattern of ownership ofthe stock of firms participating in the market
indicate that anticompetitive harm is plausible.24 2 Professor Elhauge has pro24

1

See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) ("Resort to
per se rules is confined to restraints, like those mentioned, 'that would always or almost always tend
to restrict competition and decrease output."' (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485
U.S. 717, 723 (1988))).
242 In unconcentrated, highly competitive markets, horizontal shareholding would be unlikely to
occasion anticompetitive harm. And, even in concentrated product markets, larger investments by
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posed to implement such a screen using MHII. 2 43 Specifically, he contends that
the federal antitrust agencies "should investigate any horizontal stock acquisitions that have created, or would create, a MHHIA of over 200 in a market with
an MHHIFI over 2500, in order to determine whether those horizontal stock acquisitions raised prices or are likely to do so."244 Liability would thus result where
(1) common ownership has led to MHI and MHHIA levels in excess of 2500
and 200, respectively; and (2) there are indications that common ownership has
had, or threatens, an adverse price effect in the market.
The decision costs facing enforcers and adjudicators under this approach
would be substantial.245 To determine whether the MLHHI-based thresholds were
met, they would have to define the markets where firms with common shareholders compete and calculate MHHI and MHHIA for each. If the thresholds
were exceeded, they would have to assess complicated econometric evidence
and resolve inevitable battles among experts to determine whether and to what
extent common ownership had raised or was likely to raise prices. Adjudicators
would then confront the difficult matter of allocating liability among the investors holding stakes in multiple firms competing in the market. One approach
would be to assign liability only to those intra-industry diversified investors that
could substantially reduce MHHIA by divesting from the market. Such an approach often would not work, however, for in many situations each individual
investor's unilateral divestment would reduce MHIHIA by only a slight
amount. 24 6 An alternative approach would be to impose joint liability on all investors holding stakes in multiple firms within the market. It is likely, though,
that the investor(s) from whom a plaintiff actually collected would seek contribution from other intra-industry diversified investors, and it would seem inequitable not to permit such actions. In the end, then, courts would have to find some
way to address the intractable question of how to allocate any economic harm
from common ownership among investors holding stakes in multiple competitors within the market.
undiversified blockholders (who have an interest in own-firm profit maximization) would tend to
preclude anticompetitive harm resulting from smaller holdings by intra-industry diversified investors.
See Posneret al., Proposal,supra note 6, at 684 (explaining how presence of single-firm blockholders
reduces managers' incentives to lessen competition).
243 Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supra note 5, at 1303.
244 Id. Professor Elhauge would also allow private treble damages actions
when those requirements are met. For example, "[a] class of passengers injured by paying higher airline fares because of
horizontal shareholdings on a concentrated route could . . bring suit on the theory that the stock acquisitions by institutional investors that created those horizontal shareholdings harmed the passengers
by lessening airline competition." Id at 1304.
24 5
See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 250-53 (detailing the decision costs for adjudicators
and enforcers in MHHIA-based lawsuits).
246

See Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 692-93 (offering an example to illustrate that

unilateral divestment may have little effect on MHHIA).
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As great as the decision costs would be for enforcers and adjudicators,
those facing business planners would be larger still. 247 Given that no single institutional investor could prevent the adverse price effects that would satisfy the
second element of Professor Elhauge's liability test, institutional investors could
protect themselves from liability only by negating the first, which would require
them to refrain from common ownership in markets where MHHI and MHHIA
exceed certain levels. That would require business planners to calculate and continually monitor MHHI and MHIHI\A in every market where their institutions
held stock of multiple competitors. Because both metrics are influenced by (1)
the market shares of the firms sharing common owners, (2) the ownership percentages ofthe firms' common shareholders, and (3) the ownership stakes ofthe
firms' non-diversified shareholders, an institutional investor holding shares of
competing firms could find itself at risk of antitrust liability if the market shares
of its portfolio firms rose, if other intra-industry diversified investors adjusted
their holdings of firms within the industry, or if major non-diversified shareholders decreased their ownership stakes. 248 Planners for an institutional investor
holding stakes in competing firms would therefore have to recalculate MHHI
and MHHIA on a near daily basis to ensure that the investor's stockholding-the
one thing the investor can control-could not be deemed to have contributed to a
softening of competition.
Of course, institutional investors could avoid these decision costs if they
simply refrained from holding shares of multiple firms competing in concentrated markets. 249 That appears to be the outcome that Professor Elhauge and other
common ownership critics seek to encourage with their proposals to impose antitrust liability based on mere common ownership.25 0 But, if institutional investors
were to take that tack, retail investors would lose access to many of the diversified investment opportunities that create value for them. 25
Most obviously, driving institutional investors to refrain from intra-industry
diversification would eliminate true index funds. Nearly all significant stock in247 See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 253-55 (discussing business planners'
decision costs
under Professor Elhauge's proposed MHHIA-based liability rule).
248 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. See generally Lambert
& Sykuta, supra note
29, at 271-78 (providing "A Non-Technical Guide to Calculating MHHIA").
249 And if institutional investors eschewed common ownership, antitrust enforcers and courts
would not need to incur the decision costs described above. See supra notes 247-248 and accompanying text.
251 See Elhauge, HorizontalShareholding, supra note 5, at 1314 ("When investing in horizontal
competitors would create significant horizontal shareholdings in a concentrated market, investors can
avoid antitrust liability by investing in only one of the competing firms."); Posner et al., Proposal,
supra note 6, at 714 ("Our proposal will encourage large institutional investors to shift holdings so
that they have larger stakes in individual firms for example, a large stake in GM rather than smaller
stakes in GM, Ford, and Chrysler.").
251 See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 263-64.
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dexes include more than one firm from some concentrated industry, so fund
managers could not simply invest in all the firms included in an index. Although
they could select one indexed firm from each concentrated industry, any fund
that was so managed would not be a true index fund; a hallmark of such a fund is
the absence of manager discretion, resulting in lower management fees.2 12
Inducing each institutional investor to hold stock in only one firm per concentrated industry would also reduce the variety of actively managed mutual
funds that retail investors could select. 25 3 Common ownership critics maintain
that intra-industry diversification at the institutionalinvestor level-not just at
the individual fund level-leads to softened competition in concentrated markets.25 4 That implies that institutional investors could not avoid liability for
common ownership merely by ensuring that each of their individual funds held
stock in only one firm competing in a concentrated industry. Each institutional
investor would instead have to select only one company per concentrated industry for all of its individualfunds. Thus, institutional investors could not offer a
diverse range of actively managed mutual funds featuring different investment
strategies such growth, income, or value. As an example, if Southwest Airlines
was a growth stock and United Airlines a value stock,255 an institutional investor
would be unable to offer a growth fund featuring Southwest and a value fund
featuring United.
Eschewing intra-industry diversification would also make it impossible for
institutional investors to design funds that bet on an industry as a whole but limited fund investors' exposure to company-specific risks within that industry. 25 6
Imagine, for example, a financial crisis that led to a sharp, across-the-board decline in the stock prices ofcommercial banks. A retail investor might believe that
the commercial banking sector as a whole would rebound but that some individual banks would likely fail. That investor would want to invest in commercial
252 See Alicia Adamczyk, Index Funds Are More Popular Than Ever Here's Why They're
a
SmartInvestment, CNBC (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/19/why-index-funds-are-a-

smart-investment.html [https://perma.cc/5D6F-4VZD] (observing that "because you're not paying
someone to pick stocks for you anymore, index funds tend to be less expensive for investors than
actively managed funds").
253 See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 263.
254 The airline and banking studies examine common
ownership at the institutional investor level,
not at the fund level. See Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 31, at 1523-25; Azar et al.,
Ultimate Ownership, supra note 41, at 7-8; Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 238.
255 A "growth stock" is a stock that grows more quickly than the prevailing rate of stocks in the
market, typically with highprice to equity ratios and high earnings per share. WhatAre Growth Stocks
vs Value Stocks?, CFI, https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/
growth-stocks-vs-value-stocks/ [https://perma.cc/WA3W-BLAK] (defining a "value stock" as a stock
that is traded at a discount from its intrinsic value, most often the stock in a large entity that is currently undervalued but is likely to regain value over time). Id
256 See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 263-64.
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banking generally but to limit risk by holding a diversified portfolio within the
sector. If institutional investors were induced to hold only one stock per industry,
they could not offer the sort of fund this retail investor would prefer.
The welfare squandered by eliminating these sorts of value-creating investment opportunities would constitute "error costs"-i.e., losses that result
from discouraging welfare-enhancing practices in the quest to preclude welfarereducing ones. 257 Other errorcosts would emerge if institutional investors sought
to avoid antitrust liability by remaining entirely passive-not voting their shares,
engaging with management, or threatening to sell their shares-at the firms
where they are invested. They might take such a tack so that they could claim
they had no influence over their portfolio firms, and thus could not have contributed to any softening of competition.258 But, such passivity by institutional investors creates its own costs: empirical evidence shows that long-term institutional investors tend to reduce agency costs at their portfolio firms, 25 9 and those
efficiencies would likely not be achievable if institutional investors were fully
passive.260
In the end, then, condemning mere common ownership is likely to generate
significant costs, either in the form of decision costs (if institutional investors
continue to invest in competing firms and to vote their shares), error costs (if
such investors respond to potential liability by refraining from intra-industrydiversification or remaining fully passive at theirportfolio firms), or both. It hardly
seems wise to embrace a liability rule that would generate these predictable costs
to achieve only speculative marginal benefits.
CONCLUSION

Mere common ownership-horizontal shareholding involving no effort to
coordinate portfolio firms' behavior or exercise management control and no
ownership of control-conferring stakes-does not violate the U.S. antitrustlaws.
257 See THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 10 (2018)

(defining "errorcosts"). The losses here would be Type I errorcosts welfare reductions from wrongly condemning efficient conduct. The welfare losses from failing to prevent anticompetitive instances
of common ownership would be Type II error costs. The discussion in the text treats avoidance of
Type II error costs as a marginal benefit of condemning mere common ownership.
258 Cf Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 712 (proposing an antitrust safe harbor for intraindustry diversified institutional investors who remain purely passive, as described).
259
See generally Jarrad Harford, Ambrus Kecskds & Sattar Mansi, Do Long-Term Investors Improve Corporate Decision Making?, 50 J. CORP. FIN. 424 (2018) (examining large panel of firm year
comprising around 3,000 firms annually over a near thirty-year period). Jarrad Harford, Ambrus
Kecskds, and Sattar Mansi concluded that long-term investment by active institutional investors enhanced quality of corporate management, reduced measurable instances of managerial misbehavior,
boosted innovation, decreased debt maturity (causing firms to become more exposed to financial market discipline), and increased shareholder returns. Id.
260 See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at
264-69.
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Such ownership is immune from liability under Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act because of the solely-for-investment exemption. It does not violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act because it does not involve the sort of contract, combination, or
conspiracy that is required for liability under that provision.
This is a good thing. Condemning mere common ownership under Section
7 or Section 1 would either deny investors access to valuable investment products (if institutional investors were to forego intra-industry diversification) or
increase corporate agency costs (if institutional investors opted to continue intraindustry diversification but remain completely passive in the industries that they
were diversified in). In contrast to these likely and significant marginal costs, the
marginal benefits of condemning mere common ownership are, on the current
empirical record, speculative. The studies purporting to show anticompetitive
harm from common ownership suffer from methodological difficulties, and subsequent studies contradict them. Because they fail to segregate mere common
ownership from instances of common ownership accompanied by anticompetitive agreements, they likely overstate the harms from, and thus the benefits of
prohibiting, common ownership simpliciter. On the current empirical record,
then, courts and antitrust enforcers should resist calls to expand the prohibitions
of Sections 7 and 1 to condemn mere common ownership.

